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Savings groups are an innovative instrument for bringing financial inclusion to ultra-poor,
vulnerable households who are usually not reached by traditional banking or microfinance
interventions. Savings groups are community-based financial institutions in which individual
savings are accumulated in a common pool stored in a safe box, and are lent out to requesting
members. They are generally comprised of 20 to 30 members, who meet weekly over the
operating cycle (typically lasting one year). At the end of the cycle all funds in the safe are
shared among the group’s members in proportion to the amount saved during the period of
operation. Because they can be set up and maintained with minimal outside intervention,
savings groups are spreading extremely fast in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing
countries. In 2014, an estimated 10.5 millions households worldwide were members of savings
groups, a tenfold increase relative to 2008.1 In addition, savings groups are increasingly
becoming an integral part of large-scale anti-poverty programs, where they are promoted in
conjunction with conditional cash transfers or graduation-type programs.2 These programs
often create and organize groups in which the majority of the members are ultra-poor.
Despite the rise in popularity of savings groups, very little is know about what deter-
mines their capacity to meet the financial needs of its members, especially of those who are
ultra-poor. Here we address this question by studying empirically how savings groups com-
position affects the behavior and welfare of their ultra-poor members. Our data come from
a randomized evaluation of project SCORE, a large anti-poverty program in rural Uganda.
SCORE officers identify households who are determined to be vulnerable because of their low
socioeconomic status, and then facilitate the creation of savings groups that include these
vulnerable participants as well as other members of the local community.3 Our experiment
took place in the context of an expansion of project SCORE to 90 villages. In each village,
1 From the Savings-Led Working Group (SLWG) of SEEP (available at
www.seepnetwork.org/filebin/docs/SG_Member_Numbers_Worldwide.pdf). According to the same
source in 2014, 1.2 million people belonged to savings groups in Uganda, where we conduct our intervention.
Note that these statistics are likely to understate the true participation as they are constructed from
data submitted by large NGOs, and therefore do not include groups trained by smaller organizations or
independent agents. For example, Greaney, Kaboski, and Van Leemput (2016) estimate global participation
in savings groups and self-help groups to 100 million (see Section 2.1 for the difference between savings
groups and self-help groups.)
2 For instance, both the Colombian and Dominican Republic’s conditional cash transfer programs (Red
Unidos and PROSOLI respectively) have introduced savings groups in their development programs (Salas,
2014). Graduation-type programs employing savings groups include project WINGS in Northern Uganda
(Blattman, Green, Jamison, Lehmann, and Annan, 2015). Our study is also in partnership with a large
antipoverty, graduation type program.
3 The definition of vulnerability followed by project SCORE is multi-dimensional and not limited exclu-
sively to economic vulnerability; it includes food insecurity and lacking social and family protections.
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SCORE identified 14 vulnerable households for inclusion in a savings group. We randomly
assigned these 14 households either to a single savings group, or to two separate savings
groups. In both cases, membership in the savings groups was open to self-selected members
of the community who are, on average, better off relative to our target population: they
report higher income, they are less likely to have a disabled household member, and they
are less likely to report skipping meals. Because total membership was capped at 27 we ob-
tain groups with higher or lower average socioeconomic status, which we call 50% vulnerable
groups and 25% vulnerable groups, respectively. We then carefully study the evolution of
individual savings and borrowing of all members of the savings groups created for the study.
By comparing 50% vulnerable groups and 25% vulnerable groups, we find that more
vulnerable groups generate 21% fewer total savings and disburse 33% fewer cumulative loans
midway through the cycle. At the end of the cycle (i.e., eight to twelve months after group
formation) performance metrics (cumulative savings, loans disbursed, return on savings, and
default rates) are similar in both types of groups. We find differences at the individual level:
in the middle of the cycle, targeted vulnerable households save 23% less and borrow 48% less
when randomly placed in more vulnerable groups, with this effect fading out toward the end
of the cycle. Because our initial 14 targeted vulnerable households were randomly assigned
to groups, this difference in savings and borrowing can be attributed to the intervention. In
contrast, savings and borrowing from self-selected participants does not vary significantly
with the treatment. We also show that, within our targeted population, those with worse
socioeconomic characteristics decrease their savings and borrowing by a larger amount when
placed in a more vulnerable group.
Taken together, these results can be explained by one mechanism: the fraction of vul-
nerable members of a savings group determines the group’s ability to meet the demand for
loans. Because savings accumulate slowly over time, loanable funds are initially scarce and
borrowing is rationed in all groups. However, groups composed of poorer members take
longer to accumulate funds and meet their underlying demand for loans. Therefore, in more
vulnerable groups rationing is both more severe and longer lasting. Over time both types
of groups accumulate funds and eventually satisfy the demand for loans of their vulnerable
members.
Scarcity of funds can explain why targeted vulnerable households save less when placed
in a more vulnerable group. According to the rules of savings groups, a member who wishes
to borrow must first save. Hence, whenever members expect fewer loanable funds to be
available, they may decide to decrease the amount saved with the group, thereby reinforcing
fund scarcity. Since less vulnerable members of our study groups are unaffected by the inter-
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vention, we conclude that rationing is uneven and mostly affects those who are vulnerable.
We also consider a number of additional channels through which our intervention may
have affected the functioning of the groups. Poorer groups may suffer from a lack of trust.
Using data on within-groups social connection, we find that, indeed, members of more vul-
nerable groups are, on average, less connected to other group members. However, we also
find that these difference cannot explain our treatment effects. We also consider the pos-
sibility that vulnerable members may be more likely to impose decisions that favor other
vulnerable members; or that their demand for loans may be determined by the number
of non-vulnerable members they interact with due to learning or aspirations. We find no
evidence in support of these other channels.
Finally, we use the responses to interviews carried out sixteen months after the beginning
of our intervention to study the short-term effect of the intervention on households’ welfare.
Members of more vulnerable groups are not significantly worse off in terms of total accumu-
lated savings, asset ownership, household labor supply, and overall investments in productive
activities. On the other hand, these households report a lower investment in housing and
a higher probability of selling land. Overall, one year after the intervention, the effects of
including a targeted vulnerable household in a more vulnerable group are negative but small.
Note, however, that the long-run impact of our intervention may be significantly different
from its short-run impact. Firstly, because savings groups start each new annual cycle with
zero funds, temporary limits on fund availability may occur year after year. Secondly, there
is already evidence that participation in financial groups improves social ties within members
of the group (Pande, Field, and Feigenberg, 2013). To the extent that less vulnerable groups
offer “better” social ties, participation in such groups may provide additional future gains.
Thus, the benefit of participation in less vulnerable groups may require more than one year
to fully accrue.
These findings have important policy implications. The presence of fund scarcity may
hinder the ability of savings groups to deliver financial inclusion to underprivileged popu-
lations. From a policy design perspective, scarcity could be reduced by encouraging early
savings (that can be lent out multiple times and ease the rationing of funds), allowing mem-
bers to carry part of the savings accumulated with the group to a new saving cycle, or linking
savings groups to the formal financial sector.4 Furthermore, our paper shows that there is
a trade off between financial inclusion of ultra-poor households and the ability of savings
groups to provide credit to those same ultra-poor households. This has implications for
4 In recent years, Ugandan banks such as Barclays Bank, Opportunity Bank, Post Bank and Bank of
Africa have developed lending products targeting specifically savings groups.
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welfare programs that promote participation in savings groups. Ultra-poor members may be
better served if the membership of their groups is opened up to a richer population.
The paper also holds a methodological contribution to the study of savings groups. Cur-
rent practice in evaluating savings groups relies on end-of-cycle metrics. An important
takeaway from our research is that savings groups that look very similar at the end of the
cycle may perform very differently during the cycle. Hence, a proper evaluation of savings
group performance must take into account metrics collected at various points during the
cycle.
Relation to the literature The existing literature documents positive effects of partici-
pation in savings groups (for a complete list of these studies, see the review by Gash and
Odell, 2013). For example, Beaman, Karlan, and Thuysbaert (2014), Ksoll, Lilleør, Lønborg,
and Rasmussen (2015), and Karlan, Savonitto, Thuysbaert, and Udry (2017) randomize at
village level the creation of savings groups and compare village-level outcomes in treated and
control villages. In Mali, Beaman et al. (2014) find that treated villages have higher savings
(+30%), borrowing, consumption smoothing, food security, livestock holding compared to
control villages. They also report that the wealthiest member of each village tend to select
into savings groups. Ksoll et al. (2015) find similar results in Malawi. Karlan et al. (2017)
create groups in Ghana, Malawi, and Uganda, and find positive effects on microenterprise
outcomes and women’s empowerment„ but no effect on average consumption and income.
Annan, Bundervoet, Seban, and Costigan (2013) randomize the timing of the provision of
the savings group training, and find large effects of savings groups participation on house-
hold welfare. These works establish that savings groups’ participation is overall beneficial
to participating households. We instead focus on how the composition of a savings group
determines its overall effectiveness at providing savings and credit to its members, especially
those who are ultra-poor; we do not compare the benefit of participation in a savings group
relative to no participation.
Our focus on group composition is close to Greaney, Kaboski, and Van Leemput (2016)
and Cassidy and Fafchamps (2015). Cassidy and Fafchamps (2015) find some evidence
that the (fully endogenous) process of group formation is able to match people who are
willing to save with people who desire to borrow, where the propensity to save or borrow
is measured in terms of present bias. However, they also find that people with similar
professional background join the same groups. Greaney, Kaboski, and Van Leemput (2016)
show that groups performance improves when savings groups training is paid by the group
members rather than being provided for free. They argue that poorer households are more
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likely to default on their loans, and that entry costs (in the form of training fees) discourage
them from joining a savings group. In contrast, the evidence from savings groups in our
study indicates that ultra-poor members of savings groups are not more likely to default
than other members. Furthermore, because of randomization into groups and because of
our unique member-level data, we are able to show directly that participants’ saving and
borrowing behavior respond to their group composition.5
More broadly, our study is related to the literature on financial inclusion. Several ex-
isting papers demonstrate that microentrepreneurs benefit from access to finance (see, for
example, Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster et al., 2015) and access to a safe way to store their
money (see, for example, Dupas and Robinson, 2013). The evidence remains mixed for
some segments of the population (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman, 2015) possibly because of
overindebtness (Karim, 2011). As we show later, in our experiment vulnerable households
enrolled in groups with different vulnerability profiles are differentially able to access credit
from the group during the first months of operation of the groups. By comparing the wel-
fare of vulnerable households enrolled in different types of savings groups, we can measure
the effect of extending credit to vulnerable households, which are usually not reached by
microfinance interventions.
Finally, our intervention highlights the importance of the group in shaping the choices
of the individual. Hence, it shares some similarities with experimental studies of peer ef-
fects (see Sacerdote, 2014, for a recent review of the literature). However, our paper differs
from that literature in several meaningful ways. First, peer-effect interventions usually fully
randomize group assignment, and therefore eliminate any form of endogenous self-selection.
This type of full randomization was simply unfeasible in our context. Second, most peer-
effect experiments focus on schooling, and not on financial markets. In this regard, we are
close to Pande, Field, and Feigenberg (2013), who study the impact of social interactions in
microfinance groups in India. In their paper, they experimentally varied the frequency of
interactions of microfinance groups, holding the composition of the group constant. In con-
trast, our intervention holds the frequency of group meetings constant, and experimentally
vary the composition of the group.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides background information
on how savings groups operate and project SCORE. Section 3 describes our intervention.
Section 4 describes our empirical strategy. In Section 5 we describe how our intervention
5 To our knowledge, Salas (2014) is the only other paper that studies the internal borrowing and savings
behavior of group members, and analyzes the dynamics of borrowing and savings during a single cycle. Salas
(2014) focuses on the behavioral response to a mental accounting intervention where members choose savings
goals.
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affected the composition of 25% vulnerable groups and 50% vulnerable groups. In Section
6 we present our empirical results relative to the functioning of different types of groups,
and the behavior of preselected vulnerable members of different types of groups. We discuss
possible mechanisms behind these results in Section 7. In Section 8 we discuss the effects of
our intervention on household welfare. The last section concludes.
2 Background information
2.1 Savings groups
A savings group is community-based financial institution that collects savings from its mem-
bers into a common pool, lend those funds back to its members, and typically operates over
a limited period of time (the cycle). The most common type of savings group (and the one
under analysis in our paper) is the Village Savings and Loans Association (VSLA), which
was first introduced by CARE International in Niger in 1991. VSLAs operate in the fol-
lowing way. First, an association organizer (who can be a non-governmental organization
worker or a private entrepreneur) recruits and trains potential members from the community
(typically 20-30 people). Following the training period, the group agrees on the bylaws of
the association, which include the length of the savings cycle, the interest rate charged on
loans and the value of a share.
During each weekly meeting, each member saves with the group by purchasing shares
from the group. The maximum number of shares that each person can purchase in a given
meeting is five, which imposes an upper bound to the amount that can be saved with the
group during a single meeting. Hence, unlike a ROSCA where savings contributions are
fixed, in a VSLA each member chooses each week how much to save. Savings deposits are
recorded in a group ledgers and in an individual booklet. All cash deposits are pooled and
kept in a metal safe box, which is opened only when the group is in session. Members are
not allowed to withdraw their savings during the cycle.
Borrowing starts three months after the beginning of the cycle. Individual loans are
extended to group members subject to three constraints: the group must agree on the stated
purpose of the loan; loan sizes are restricted to three times the amount saved by the borrower
until that point; and disbursements should not exceed the amount available in the safe box.
Loans must be repaid within three months, and the interest on the principal compounds
monthly. Once the loan is paid back, the borrower is eligible to receive another loan.
Three months before the end of the cycle, loan disbursements end and outstanding loans
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are repaid. The last meeting is devoted to the share out : the content of the safe box is
emptied and divided among the members of the group in a way that is proportional to the
amount each person saved. A new cycle is eventually started. Between the end of the old
cycle and the beginning of the new cycle the group composition may change and the rules
governing the group may be modified.6
Loans and share out provide participants with a sizable amounts of funds. As can be seen
in Appendix Table B1, among vulnerable participants in our study groups, the single most
common use (44% of loans and 39% of share out) is the payment of school fees. In addition,
35% of loans and 40% of share out amounts are used for some type of productive investment,
including starting a new business, purchasing of farm inputs such as livestock and land, or
other business investment. Loans are somewhat more likely than share out to be used for
emergencies, such as a health incident or unemployment (22% versus 16%). Conversely, and
quite predictably, households are almost twice as likely to report consuming their share out
(29%) than their loans (16%).7
The VSLA model has been adopted and modified by other organizations, generating
substantial heterogeneity in the types of savings groups currently existing. Most of these
variations maintain the basic rules described above but modify the way the group is trained
or accounts are kept.8 We also make a distinction between savings groups and self-help
groups. Self-help groups developed in India simultaneously to and independently from the
VSLA model (and its variations). Typically, they do not return all funds to their members
during share out, but instead distribute profits or dividends over time. For this reason,
assuming a similar composition, savings groups and self-help groups are likely to generate
very different levels of savings and loans.9
6 See Allen and Staehle (2007) and Allen and Panetta (2010) for the full description of the VSLA program
guidelines.
7 Fund use is self reported. Consumption here excludes expenditure in durables, negative shocks (health
related or otherwise), and payment of school fees.
8 See, for example, Savings and internal lending communities (SILC) promoted by Catholic Relief Services,
and Oxfam’s Saving for Change (SfC). However, some models also modify the way the share out is conducted
(i.e., MUSO and Pact-WORTH model). These models are much less common than VSLA, SILC or SfC.
9 For a more detailed discussion regarding the types of savings groups and the difference between savings
groups and self help groups, see Allen and Panetta (2010), Ashe (2009), Vanmeenen (2010). Note that
the distinction between self-help groups and savings groups described here is gaining popularity but is not
universally adopted. For example, Greaney et al. (2016) study SILCs (which, according to our classification
are savings groups) but call these groups “self-help groups”. Blattman et al. (2015) also follow the same
terminology when referring to VSLAs.
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2.2 Conceptual framework
The primary role of a savings group is to channel funds from members who want to save
to members who want to borrow. However, contrary to the way a frictionless credit market
operates, the rules governing the functioning of a savings group do not guarantee that, in
each period, supply will match demand of funds. In this section, we discuss the causes of
this potential mismatch, and how the composition of the savings group may affect it.10
The main reason for the potential mismatch between demand and supply of funds is
that savings earn the same return independently on when they are contributed to the group,
which creates the incentive to save as late as possible. This is inefficient because early savings
are more beneficial to the group than late savings. Early savings can be lent our multiple
times, and each time they are lent out they generate a return that can also be lent out. Note
that this inefficiency is mitigated by two elements. The presence of an upper bound to the
amount that can be saved during each period forces members who desire to save with the
group more than this upper bound to spread their savings over multiple periods. In addition,
for those who plan to borrow, early savings can be used to obtain multiple loans. Despite
this, within a savings group funds may be scarce when they are most valuable, that is at the
beginning of the cycle.
In case funds are scarce, there is no presumption that all members of a savings group are
equally rationed, i.e., it is possible that some members are able to meet their demand for
loans while others are not.11 Because not everybody in the group may be rationed out of
funds, the initial rules chosen by the group may lead to an inefficient generation funds. For
example, as long as the majority of the group is able to meet his/her demand for loans, the
group may decide to constrain the supply of funds to increase the return on savings.
The possibility of a mismatch between demand and supply of funds implies that, con-
trolling for the cost of borrowing, the benefit of group participation depends on the group
composition. For example, replacing a member with a low propensity to save with one with
a high propensity to save may not affect the rules chosen by the group (because it does
not affect who the "median" member is), but will increase the availability of funds and the
probability that the demand for loans of its members is satisfied.
Finally, note that, because a group member who wishes to borrow must first save, we
should expect a positive correlation between level of borrowings and level of savings. That
is, in groups in which more loanable funds are available, the possibility of receiving larger
10 This framework is based on the theoretical model developed in Burlando, Canidio, and Selby (2016).
11 There is no official rule or mechanism that determines the allocation of funds in case of scarcity, and
each group may proceed in different ways.
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loans should increase the savings level of potential borrowers. This mechanism is relevant
because it tends to make scarcity of funds more severe. Also, in most groups, funds may
be scarce during some periods (especially early on in the cycle) and abundant in others. In
these cases, exogenously increasing the supply of savings will be beneficial to the group if
scarcity is the most relevant case.
2.3 Project SCORE
Our research project is in partnership with project SCORE, a joint program of four NGOs
based in Uganda (AVSI, CARE, TPO, FHI360) that provide services to 125,000 vulnerable
children and their households in 35 districts across Uganda. Project SCORE (Sustainable
COmprehensive REsponses for vulnerable children and their families) was launched in the
fall of 2011 with a USD 9 million USAID grant. Project SCORE is a set of interventions
implemented over a period of 5 years having the following goals: to identify vulnerable
children in ultra-poor households across communities in Uganda; to improve their socio-
economic status, food security, and nutrition status; and to increase the availability and
access to protective, legal and other critical services. Targeted households receive a number of
interventions, including classes on advanced farming techniques, cooking, nutrition, business
training and business development. Contrary to other comprehensive anti-poverty programs
targeting ultra-poor households (such as the ones studied by Banerjee, Duflo, Goldberg et
al., 2015, and Blattman et al., 2015) SCORE offers no transfers to targeted households,
neither in money nor in kind.
The most important intervention carried out under SCORE enrolls beneficiaries into
SCORE-created savings groups, which follow CARE’s VLSA model. Such groups are formed
by first registering SCORE recipients, and then enrolling other interested community resi-
dents. Crucially, SCORE requires that at least half the membership is composed of SCORE
recipients. As a consequence, compared with VSLAs supported by other organizations,
SCORE groups are generally more inclusive of vulnerable and marginal households.
Importantly, the four NGOs involved in program SCORE do not provide services directly.
Rather, they outsource all interventions to a number of smaller community-based local or-
ganizations (which we refer to as Implementing Partners or IPs), which typically operate in
only a few villages. 22 IPs participated in our research, giving rise to a large variation in
the capabilities of the organizations carrying out the intervention. We will control for this
variation in our empirical analysis.
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3 The Intervention
Our experiment takes place in the context of an expansion of project SCORE to 90 mostly
rural villages not previously served by the project. This expansion was spread throughout
Uganda, involving 28 districts in the Western, Central, Eastern and Northern regions, start-
ing in January 2013. The objective of the intervention is to randomly assign ultra-poor
households to groups composed of a higher or lower fraction of ultra-poor members.
Timeline and protocol In each study village, SCORE representatives worked with local
organizations and government officials to identify ultra-poor households with children. Iden-
tified households were further screened through a questionnaire, aimed at assessing their
level of vulnerability and their eligibility for inclusion into project SCORE (see Appendix A
for the full list of vulnerability indicators employed). Once enrolled, social workers carried
out additional interviews to determine whether the household was interested in joining a
VSLA. The enrollment process into the study stopped once SCORE identified 14 households
per village who were willing to form a savings group. We refer to these households as the
preselected study participants. All preselected participants enrolled were given access to
other standard SCORE services.
Once the screening was completed, the research team randomly assigned 32 villages to
a 25% treatment, and the remaining 58 villages to a 50% treatment.12 In villages assigned
to the 50% treatment, one 50% vulnerability group was formed, comprised of 14 preselected
participants, thus following the standard SCORE protocol. In villages assigned to the 25%
vulnerable treatment two separate 25% vulnerability groups were formed, each comprised of
seven preselected participants.13 If one decided not to join their assigned savings group, they
were replaced with another ultra-poor households enrolled in project SCORE.
The remaining members of each VSLA was made up by members of the local community,
whom we refer to as community participants. The size of the group was capped at 27. Field
officers enrolled community participants through a process of engagement which included
presentations in local markets, churches, and community-based organizations. Note that
both community participants and SCORE replacements joined during group formation and
after randomization; for this reason, we pool them together in a self-selected category in
12 The smallest administrative unit in Uganda is the parish, which comprises several village. To avoid
treatment spillovers, the study was limited to one village in each parish except for eleven larger parishes.
In these larger parishes, geographically-distant villages were included in the study and assigned to the same
treatment.
13 The decision to sort preselected participant was delegated to the field officers in charge of forming the
groups.
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Figure 1: Randomization strategy–Group formation stage
our analysis. See Figure 1 for a schematic of the intervention. Group formation and group
training took place between April and July 2013. Final membership, rules of operations, and
length of cycle were formalized on the first day of the cycle after training concluded, and
groups then operated for six months to one year before sharing out. The study concluded in
December 2014. Figure 2 summarizes the timeline of the intervention.
Characteristics of study participants Table 1 report the vulnerability profile of pres-
elected households, constructed using the answers to the screening questionnaire used by
SCORE. These ultra-poor households face significant challenges in their daily life. For in-
stance, one fifth have a child involved in child labor, 15% have a member with a chronic
disease, 40% have a member with disabilities, and 50% of them contain an orphan child. In
addition, households in the sample report very limited economic resources, with an average
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Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Difference
(St. Dev.) (St.Dev.) (T-Stat.) (St. Dev.) (St.Dev.) (T-Stat.)
Child labor (yes=1, no=0) 0.219 0.0826 0.136*** 0.247 0.189 0.058
(0.414) (0.275) (6.039) (0.431) (0.392) (1.117)
Drug abuse at home (yes=1, no=0) 0.0951 0.0213 0.0738*** 0.105 0.0577 0.0473
(0.294) (0.144) (3.207) (0.307) (0.234) (1.204)
Chronic disease (yes=1, no=0) 0.179 0.0712 0.108*** 0.173 0.141 0.032
(0.383) (0.257) (5.188) (0.378) (0.348) (0.859)
Disability in household (yes=1, no=0) 0.409 0.297 0.113*** 0.401 0.369 0.032
(0.492) (0.457) (3.195) (0.490) (0.483) (0.476)
Food insecure (yes=1, no=0) 0.708 0.509 0.199*** 0.706 0.648 0.058
(0.455) (0.500) (3.817) (0.456) (0.478) (0.766)
Quality diet 2.214 2.383 -0.169 2.254 2.161 0.093
(0.869) (0.783) (-1.628) (0.873) (0.794) (0.707)
Number of daily meals 1.111 1.925 -0.814*** 1.139 1.074 0.065
(1.021) (0.826) (-5.654) (1.029) (1.019) (0.253)
Informal employment (yes=1, no=0) 0.606 0.744 -0.139*** 0.548 0.650 -0.102
(0.489) (0.436) (-4.360) (0.498) (0.478) (-1.340)
Household unemployed (yes=1, no=0) 0.144 0.0873 0.0566 0.157 0.143 0.014
(0.351) (0.282) (1.530) (0.364) (0.350) (0.272)
Orphaned child in hhld (yes=1, no=0) 0.515 0.320 0.195*** 0.491 0.516 -0.025
(0.500) (0.467) (5.159) (0.500) (0.500) (-0.358)
Safe source of water (yes=1, no=0) 0.713 0.610 0.103* 0.674 0.627 0.047
(0.453) (0.488) (1.879) (0.469) (0.484) (0.403)
Access to latrines (yes=1, no=0) 0.753 0.896 -0.143*** 0.769 0.765 0.004
(0.431) (0.305) (-3.833) (0.421) (0.425) (0.0834)
Income per capita (UGX) 7,157 9,923 -2,766*** 7,456 6,481 975
(8,915) (14,056) (-3.034) (9,676) (7,770) (0.842)
Assessor scale 1.920 1.493 0.428*** 1.906 1.965 -0.059
(0.602) (0.775) (7.159) (0.611) (0.527) (-0.948)
Number of hhld members 6.530 6.415 0.115 6.338 6.634 -0.296
(2.724) (3.274) (0.442) (2.656) (2.736) (-1.205)
Vulnerability index 0.473 -0.403 0.877*** 0.557 0.369 0.188
(1.245) (1.192) (6.252) (1.264) (1.179) (1.070)
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group 0.655 0.402 1 0
P-value of F-test:
All coefficients jointly significant (all preselected) 0.6534
All coefficients jointly significant (only preselected enrolled in VSLA – no dropouts) 0.5943
A. All group participants B. Preselected only
Columns A. Sample includes all preselected and self-selected participants of study savings groups. 
Columns B. Sample includes preselected only (enrolled in groups and group dropouts).
Quality diet is a numerical score (0-3) with one point assigned to each different category of food eaten by children in the household. 
Assessor scale is numerical score (0 to 3) of vulnerability based on the direct observation of the assessor. Higher values is more vulnerable. 
Total score is overall score of vulnerability. Higher values are more vulnerable. 
See appendix A for a detailed description of all indicators. 
All T-statistics of differences are clustered at the village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reported p-values of F-tests of joint significance of regression of characteristics on treatment dummy. The first p-value includes data from preselected 
dropouts. The second p-value excludes group dropouts.
Baseline measures of household 
vulnerability
Column A: Sample of all preselected and self-selected participants of study savings groups. Column B.
Sample of preselected only (enrolled in groups and group dropouts).
Quality diet is a num ical score (0-3) with o point assigned to each different category of food eaten by
children in the household. Assessor scale is numerical score (0 to 3) of vulnerability based on the direct
observation of the assessor. Higher values is more vulnerable. Total score is overall score of vulnerability.
Higher values are more vulnerable. See appendix A for a detailed description of all indicators. All T-statistics
of differences are clustered at the village level. Reported p-values of F-tests of joint significance of regression
of characteristics on treatment dummy. The first p-value includes data from preselected dropouts. The
second p-value excludes group dropouts. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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monthly income of 41,000 UGX (approximately $1514). This is consistent with a very low
reported consumption of little more than one meal per day. On the other hand, many (over
60%) of these households do have access to public infrastructure like latrines and well wa-
ter. Table 1 column 2 reports the same characteristics for the self-selected members of our
study groups. Along almost all vulnerability measures self-selected are significantly better
off compared to preselected.15 The remaining columns of Table 1 report that the vulnera-
bility profile of members of 25% and 50% vulnerable groups are similar, indicating that the
treatment arms are balanced as intended.
Group formation process Table 2, panel A describes the group formation process. 56
50%-vulnerable groups (out of the expected 58) and 60 25%-vulnerable groups (out of 64)
were formed. Setting up 25% vulnerable groups took an average of 15 extra days (81 days
on average from randomization to first day of operations, relative to the 66 days needed in
other treatment). The makeup of the groups follows the intended assignment (50% SCORE
14 Exchange rate in January 2013 was 2,660 UGX per dollar.
15 The only exception is “access to safe source of water” (i.e. well water).
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Table 2: Group formation statistics
Group formation statistics
Total
Panel A: Group Composition
Number of VSLAs (planned) 58 64 122
Number of VSLAs formed (actual) 56 60 116
Fraction formed 96.6% 93.8% 95.1%
Time to form (days since randomization) 66.1 81.8 74.2
Number of SCORE beneficiaries enrolled 765 422 1,158
Number of non-beneficiaries enrolled 771 1,256 1,940
Fraction composed of SCORE beneficiaries 49.8% 25.1% 37.4%
Panel B: Dropouts and substitutes
Pre-selected participants 798 436 1,234
Pre-selected participants not enrolled (dropped out) 164 100 264
Fraction of pre-selected who dropped out 20.6% 22.9% 21.4%
Panel C: Access to financial services in community
Number of VSLAs in village 4.1 4.59 4.28
Number of formal Credit Union (SACCOs) in parish 0.37 0.26 0.34
Number of formal banks in parish 0.03 0 0.01
Number of MFIs 0 0 0




Drop out participants were assigned to a VSLA but never formally enrolled. This excludes enrolled partici-
pants who were assigned a savings booklet and a personal ID number but eventually dropped out. Panel
C includes statistics from a community survey carried out one year after the start of the intervention.
Statistics reported are average number of branches in 88 study villages (for VSLAs) excluding one outlier
(with 100 VSLAs reported); and the average number of banks, SACCO and MFI branches in the 74
parishes. Recall the parish is a larger administrative unit than the village.
beneficiaries in 50% vulnerable groups and 25% in 25% vulnerable groups).
Panel B describes movements in and out of the group. Only 79% of preselected households
enrolled into a study savings group, indicating significant turnover in the initial membership.
Appendix Table B2 shows that the probability of enrollment is uncorrelated with treatment
assignment, but households who are food insecure, host orphan children, or have chronically
ill members are more likely to remain enrolled.
Panel C shows the availability of financial institutions (VSLAs, credit unions, banks)
in the study villages. These statistics come from a census of financial institutions in study
villages carried out in 2014. Most villages have a number of savings groups operating, and the
total number of VSLAs (including our study groups) is similar across the two types of villages.
Regression analysis, reported in Appendix B Table B3, confirms that the difference in the
number of groups across villages in different treatment arms is not statistically significant.
Study areas have also similar population and access to other formal financial services (i.e.,
banks, MFIs or SACCOs). In other words, our intervention did not change the relative
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availability of financial services.
3.1 Data
Our data consists of baseline and endline household surveys collected during one-on-one
interviews of study participants, and financial records from three audits of group finances
carried out during the first cycle of operation.
Baseline data Our baseline information includes the variables from the screening tool used
to determine the vulnerability of prospective SCORE beneficiaries. The tool contains ques-
tions on the household’s socioeconomic status (income per capita, food security, access to
safe water and latrines) and the well-being of the children belonging to the household (in-
cluding disability and history of physical or mental abuse). Appendix A has a full description
of the variables and the indicators collected in the screening tool and used in this paper.
The vulnerability screening tool was administered to all SCORE beneficiaries enrolled
in study groups. To complete the group vulnerability profile, enumerators administered the
same questionnaire to community participants shortly after groups formed. Using the pre-
intervention data from beneficiaries and post-intervention data from community participants,
we construct a profile of baseline characteristics for groups in the two treatment arms.16
Data collectors also administered an additional baseline module to all community par-
ticipants as well as a sample of SCORE beneficiaries. This module included questions on
within-group social connections, such as the number of family members or neighbors who
are members of their same VSLA. The respondents also listed the names of people whom
they “seek advice from”, “give advice to,” “visit at their home”. They also reported whether
any of the people mentioned is also participating in their VSLA.
VSLA administrative records Information on savings and borrowing behavior for all
groups participants comes from administrative records collected by SCORE field officers
during their regular financial audit of VSLAs. The assessment of study groups was car-
ried out following standard procedures in SCORE: field officers reviewed transactions and
record-keeping, reconciled discrepancies between cash ledgers and savings booklets, and fi-
nally reported audited figures in a standard audit form. The information collected included
savings, borrowing, and repayments of each member up to the audit date; whether the
16 While applying the “baseline” terminology may be a slight abuse of language in this context, it is unlikely
that the treatment had an effect on vulnerability immediately after the groups were formed.
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borrower was in arrears; and whether the member dropped out of the group during the
evaluation period. The visits were conducted approximately every four months, giving rise
to three waves of data collection: after approximately 4 months of operation (wave I ), after
approximately 8 month of operation (wave II ), and at the end of the operating cycle of the
group (share out).17 Auditors also reported the interest rate charged on loans and the value
of the share.
Table 3 provides summary statistics of financial transactions from the financial audits.
Most groups chose interest rates on loans equal to 3%, 5% and 10% (average 8.6%, mode
10%). Two groups (both 50% vulnerable) chose an interest of 20% per month. Share values
average 888 UGX ($0.35), with most groups choosing either 500 UGX or 1,000 UGX, and
five groups 2,000 UGX. Groups members earned a return of 13% for every shilling saved
with their respective VSLA.
The rest of the table describes the data collected during the three audit periods. Average
cumulative savings of all participants grow slowly, reaching 100,000 UGX (approximately
$40) by the end of the cycle. Likewise, average cumulative loans increase from 41,000 UGX
($15.40) during the first audit wave to 166,000 UGX ($62) by the end of the cycle. The
average member obtained 2.7 loans by the end of the cycle. By the time of the first wave of
data collection, almost 70% of members had obtained at least one loan, and the proportion
increases to almost 90% by the end of the cycle.
Only 1.5% of loans were considered past due in the first audit wave one, 8.3% in the
second, and 3% by the end of the cycle. Note that having an outstanding loan at share out
does not imply a default on a loan, as groups seize the savings of borrowers with unpaid
loans at share out. Hence, the actual defaults (always partial) are much fewer than 3%.
Overall, the groups are effective at preventing defaults and late repayments.
Finally, the data suggest that funds are scarce within the group. This is illustrated in
Figure 3, which shows that the overall funds-utilization rate (total cumulative loans over
total cumulative savings) increases over time, starting from 1.3 and reaching approximately
1.5. That is, loans disbursed in each period grow faster than savings contributed in each
period. This is possible because as past loans are repaid to the group (with interest) they
can be lent out again. This is suggestive of scarcity, because when extra funds are introduced
into the group (in the form of loans repayment), they are quickly lent out again.
17 Seventeen groups chose an abbreviated cycle; for those groups, the last two audits are very similar or
identical.
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Pre-selected participants 0.302 0.459
SCORE beneficiaries 0.369 0.483
Interest rate 8.686 2.779
Share price 888.2 307.3
Audit Wave I
Number of meetings (to date) 17.99 7.294
Savings per person (to date)-UGX 41,868 35,762
Average number of shares purchased per person per meeting 2.659 1.767
Member borrowed at least once 0.681 0.466
Number of loans per person 1.420 1.346
Average amount borrowed per person (to date)--UGX 68,338 116,943
Member has loans past due 1.503 2.859
0.0159 0.125
Audit Wave II
Number of meetings (to date) 34.57 13.32
Savings per person (to date)-UGX 86,226 60,835
Average number of shares purchased per person per meeting 2.578 2.277
Member borrowed at least once 0.806 0.396
Number of loans per person 2.357 1.637
Average amount borrowed per person (to date)--UGX 132,274 205,087
Member has loans past due 0.0826 0.275
Audit Wave III-End of cycle
Number of meetings (to date) 46.67 9.072
Savings per person (to date)-UGX 98,790 64,926
Average number of shares purchased per person per meeting 2.500 1.514
Member borrowed at least once 0.893 0.309
Number of loans per person 2.675 1.900
Average amount borrowed per person (to date)--UGX 166,398 256,350
Member has loans past due 0.0309 0.173
Member enrolled in 25% vulnerable group 0.477 0.500
Number of VSLAs formed 116
Data from audits of savings groups. Each observation is a member of the group; includes both preselected who joined the 
group and self selected.  
Endline data Approximately one and a half years from the date of groups formation, we
conducted an endline survey of all preselected households that were originally assigned to a
savings group.18 The objective of the endline survey was to measure the welfare effect of par-
ticipation into 50% or 25% vulnerable VSLAs for preselected households. The questionnaire
covered asset ownership, food security, savings behavior, investment behavior, and satisfac-
18 We were unable to administer the endline survey to the self-selected participants of our study savings
groups due to budget limitations.
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tion with various aspects of the savings group. The tracking team was able to find and
survey 983 households, representing 77% of the original sample of study participants. Web
Appendix Table X regresses the baseline vulnerability indicators on whether the household
was tracked at endline. It finds that the probability of being found is higher for households
having a member with a chronic disease and for households hosting orphaned children. Dif-
ferential attrition is a concern: using the nonattrited sample, a regression of the treatment
dummy on the set of baseline characteristics shows some imbalance for two vulnerability indi-
cators (use of child labor and informal employment), even though the F-test of the regression
is not statistically significant. We rebalance the sample in the analysis using weighted least
squares (WLS) as discussed in the next section.
4 Empirical strategy
Our empirical analysis has three main steps. We first establish whether the composition
of 25% vulnerable groups and 50% vulnerable groups differ. Having established that more
vulnerable groups are indeed poorer, we then use data from financial audits of the groups
to study the savings and borrowing behavior of the preselected members (i.e. the randomly
assigned population) of these savings groups. Lastly, we use endline data to study the effect
of the intervention on the welfare of the preselected.
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Differences between 25% vulnerable groups and 50% vulnerable groups. The first
task is to compare the composition of groups across the two treatments. Whether the aver-
age member of a 50% vulnerable group is, indeed, more vulnerable than the average member
of a 25% vulnerable group depends, crucially, on the characteristics of the self-selected pop-
ulation, and on whether these characteristics vary by the type of group. For instance, the
two types of groups may be very similar (despite the randomization) if self-selected partic-
ipants in 50% vulnerable groups are less vulnerable than self-selected participants in 25%
vulnerable groups.
Using the vulnerability data we collected on both self-selected and preselected house-
holds, we thus regress vulnerability characteristic y for participant i in group g on her group
assignment:
xig = α0 + α1 × 50% V ulnerable Groupg + α2 × Preselectedig +
α3 × 50% V ulnerable Groupg × Preselectedig + ωig, (1)
where 50% V ulnerable Groupg is an indicator variable that identifies the assignment to a
50% vulnerable group, and Preselectedig is the indicator that identifies preselected from self-
selected participants. The coefficient α1 describes systematic differences between self-selected
participants in the two types of groups;19 α2 describes differences between preselected and
self-selected in 50% vulnerable groups, and the coefficient α3 is the difference-in-difference
estimator. Due to randomization, we expect α3 to be zero.
Ultimately, we expect the treatment to affect the financial performance of the group in
some systematic way. To establish how group-level outcomes differ across treatment arms,
we estimate
yg = αg × 50% V ulnerable Groupg +Xgβ1 + εg, (2)
where yg is an outcome (aggregate cumulative savings, aggregate cumulative borrowing,
return on savings, and default rates) measured during audit wave t; αg is the coefficient that
describes the difference in aggregate outcomes between the two types of groups, and Xg is a
group level control matrix, which may include the number of VSLA meetings at audit wave
t, interest rate, share price, implementing partner fixed effect and a constant.
19 It is important to emphasize that the results in equation (1) are only indicative of differential selec-
tion along observable criteria. Self-selected participants in different types of groups may differ along other
unobservable characteristics, such as their demand for savings or credit.
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Individual account behavior Aggregate responses to the treatment captured by (2) can
be thought of as the result of two effects: one arising from observed and unobserved com-
positional differences between the two treatment arms, and one arising from participants’
behavior responding to the composition of the group. While we cannot directly measure
the former, due to random assignment of preselected we can measure the latter. Consider
preselected person i in group g, and denote her individual-level outcome of interest at audit
wave t (cumulative savings, borrowings, late repayment, and so on) by ypreigt . The empirical
specification is
ypreig = α× 50% V ulnerable Groupg +Xgβ1 + ε
pre
ig , (3)
where Xg are group-level controls from (2). The key coefficient of interest is the intent to
treat estimator, α. It describes the difference in saving and borrowing behavior of a person
who is randomly assigned to a 50% vulnerable group as opposed to a 25% vulnerable group.
Because of random assignment, the preselected participants should not have observed or
unobserved differences in their willingness to save or to borrow. Any difference between
treatment arms (captured by the coefficient α) measures the individual members’ causal
response to their group assignment.
A few additional technical notes on estimating equations (1)-(3) are required. First, due
to noncompliance, we do not consider the realized fraction of vulnerable members of a VSLA,
but rather we use the randomization assignment as our intervention measure. Second, it is
likely that outcomes are autocorrelated within each village, and therefore errors are clustered
at the village level. Finally, to deal with outliers and data entry mistakes, we trim the top
1% of individual savings, borrowings, and borrowing-to-savings ratio in each audit round
dataset.20
Effects on welfare We complete the paper by discussing the effect of our intervention on
household welfare. Lacking endline data on self-selected, we focus our attention on those
members who were randomly assigned to groups (the preselected). For each outcome ypreig ,
we estimate equation (3) on the full sample of preselected, including those who did not join
their assigned VSLA. As before, the coefficient α is the intent to treat estimator. Because the
sample includes preselected households who declined to join their group, our regression does
not control for group characteristics. In addition, we also report the estimate of α obtained
by limiting the sample to those preselected who joined their assigned VSLA. Significant
effort was exerted in finding all preselected participants, including dropouts. This meant
20 Estimates are larger in magnitude and more likely to be significant if trimming is not used; see tables
in the Web Appendix.
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that interview teams revisited study areas multiple times in search of respondents, over a
period of time that covered four months. A month-of-interview dummy is included to capture
seasonal differences due to different interview periods. Despite our best efforts, as discussed
earlier there is evidence of differential attrition between the two treatment arms. We use the
approach in DiNardo et al. (1996) to “rebalance” the treatment arms. In practice, we use
baseline characteristics to generate predicted probabilities of not being found in the endline,
and use these as weights in a weighted least square (WLS) estimation model. This method
is similar to inverse probability weights (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) and is employed
in other RCT studies to address attrition (e.g., Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster et al., 2015).
Since the differential attrition problem is not severe, results from WLS are very similar to
unweighted OLS.21 In addition, to account for the possibility of falsely identifying significant
effects when considering multiple outcomes, we report significance levels adjusted with the
Benjamini-Hochberg step-up method (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
5 Group composition
Our intervention was successful at generating different vulnerability profiles in the two treat-
ment arms. Table 4 shows that, on average, the vulnerability index is significantly higher
in 50% vulnerable groups: participants are more likely to skip meals, have higher subjec-
tive measures of vulnerability as reported by assessors, and are poorer than the comparison.
They are also more likely to report having access to a safe source of water, possibly as a
result of the inclusion in SCORE.
Table 5 estimates equation (1). The coefficient on Preselected confirms that preselected
are more vulnerable than self-selected, while the coefficient on 50% V ulnerable Group shows
that the self-selected in these groups are slightly worse off compared to self-selected in 25%
vulnerable groups. This is fully explained by the fact that many self-selected participants are
vulnerable replacements for preselected who dropped out of the group. In Appendix Table
B4 we demonstrate that, at least among observable characteristics, community members
joining 25% vulnerable groups are similar to those joining 50% vulnerable groups.22
21 OLS results, as well as tests for common support of the predicted probabilities, are available from the
authors upon request.
22 This result may sound surprising, because in villages assigned to the 25% treatment, roughly three times
as many community members joined our study VSLAs relative to villages assigned to the 50% treatment.
However, our intervention did not differentially affected the total number of VSLAs operating in the study
villages (see Table 2). It may be that our intervention only affected the sorting of households across different
VSLAs (some of which are not part of our study).
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Table 4: Vulnerability profile at baseline: 25% vs. 50% vulnerable groups
Regressions on sample of VSLA participant households only (preselected plus self-selected) and including IP
fixed effects. Sample of preselected interviewed prior to group formation; sample of self-selected interviewed
after group formation. Quality diet is a numerical score (0-3) with one point assigned to each different
category of food eaten by children in the household. Assessor scale is numerical score (0 to 3) of vulnerability
based on the direct observation of the assessor. Higher values is more vulnerable. Total score is overall score
of vulnerability. Higher values are more vulnerable. See Appendix A for all other definitions. Errors clustered
at the village level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Preselected 0.098* 0.043* 0.138*** 0.203** 0.167** -0.108** 0.114***
(0.050) (0.024) (0.042) (0.078) (0.080) (0.051) (0.042)
50% vulnerable 
group
0.023 0.010 0.066** 0.061 0.045 -0.063* 0.046*




-0.034 0.039 -0.033 -0.092 -0.009 -0.066 -0.010
(0.059) (0.040) (0.052) (0.081) (0.093) (0.062) (0.054)
Observations 2,735 2,470 2,469 2,474 2,686 2,741 2,741






















Preselected 0.015 0.018 -0.113*** 0.480*** -3,083*** 0.153 0.702***
(0.027) (0.077) (0.034) (0.079) (1,119) (0.429) (0.159)
50% vulnerable 
group
0.024 0.103 -0.005 0.099 166 -0.242 0.278**




0.061 0.070 -0.006 -0.069 444 -0.236 0.066
(0.041) (0.096) (0.061) (0.114) (1,749) (0.446) (0.215)
Observations 2,741 2,385 2,761 2,474 2,718 2,749 2,438
R-squared 0.124 0.358 0.120 0.161 0.132 0.038 0.213
Regressions on sample of VSLA participant households only (preselected plus self-selected) and including IP
fixed effects. Sample of preselected interviewed prior to group formation; sample of self-selected interviewed
after group formation. Quality diet is a numerical score (0-3) with one point assigned to each different
category of food eaten by children in the household. Assessor scale is numerical score (0 to 3) of vulnerability
based on the direct observation of the assessor. Higher values is more vulnerable. Total score is overall score
of vulnerability. Higher values are more vulnerable. See Appendix A for all other definitions. Errors clustered




We first use the data from the three audit waves to study the effects of the intervention on
the aggregate performance of the study groups. We look at the rules chosen by the group,
aggregate savings and borrowing, return on savings, and default rates.
Share price and interest rates At the group formation stage, members must decide on
the interest rate and on the share price. Qualitative interviews suggest that groups make
this decision with very limited information on what would be a reasonable rule, and many
groups adjust the rules in the following cycle.23 In Table 6 we show that our intervention
had no effect on the rules chosen by the groups, with the exception of a small difference in
the proportion of groups that chose a share price of 1,000 UGX or above.
Aggregate savings, aggregate borrowings, return on savings and defaults Table 7
reports the estimation of coefficient αg in equation (2), using data from wave I (panel A),
wave II (panel B), and at share out (Panel C), where the outcomes of interest are aggregate
cumulative savings and borrowings, rate of return on loans, and late repayment of loans. For
each outcome variable, we report three separate specifications. Column 1 reports regressions
without controls; column 2 includes implementing partner (IP) fixed effects and number of
meetings at time of audit; and column 3 adds rules fixed effects. Our preferred specifications
control for the IP and the number of meetings. This is because groups depend crucially on
the expertise of the IPs to create groups, obtain proper training, choose interest rates and
share values, ensure that meetings follow rules, and verify that accounts are kept correctly.
We thus expect that savings and borrowing rates differ significantly across IPs. Our sample
includes IPs with different capabilities and expertise in forming and managing groups, and
our intervention is not balanced across IPs, which implies that IPs ability could be different
across the two treatment arms. In addition, controlling for the number of meetings absorbs
the variability in outcomes associated with different data collection times over the lending
cycle.24 Whether one should include share price and interest rate dummies in the regression
is more debatable. On the one hand, the choice of rules may be considered as a channel
23 45% of groups increased their share price in the subsequent cycle, which suggests that the share price
chosen in year one may have been suboptimal. On the other hand, only 7% of groups adjusted the interest
rate.
24 The intervention did not systematically affect the number of meetings in the cycle.
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Table 6: Impact of the intervention on interest rate and share prices
Table reports coefficients on 50% vulnerable group treatment from group level regressions. Dependent
variable is column title. Implementing partner fixed effects included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
through which the intervention affects group outcomes. In this case, it is best to exclude
rule dummies and allow the 50% vulnerable group variable to pick up the overall effect. On
the other hand, including the dummies is necessary if one is interested in the effect of the
intervention net of the cost of borrowing. We report both sets of estimates, and note that,
in general, estimates with rule dummies are more conservative.
Panel A shows that, shortly after groups are formed, there are no statistically significant
differences in cumulative savings or lending between the two treatment arms. The result does
not vary in the specification that excludes interest rate and price level controls (column 2)
or includes them (column 3). This is not entirely surprising because the data were collected
after, on average, four months of operation, and significant differences are not yet evident.
The situation is markedly different in the second wave of data collection (panel B).
Looking at the last two columns, estimates indicate that more vulnerable groups accumulated
over 400,000 UGX fewer savings, representing 19% of the 2.1 million UGX saved by 25%-
vulnerable groups on average. They also disbursed almost 900,000 UGX less. While the
coefficient on loans in column 3 is not precisely estimated (p-value: 0.126), the implied
magnitude of this difference is large, being 27% of the 3.3 million UGX average cumulative
lending in 25% vulnerable groups.
Differences in cumulative savings and loans disbursed narrow remarkably by share out
(panel C). Point estimates from column 2 indicate that more vulnerable groups accumulated
150,000 UGX fewer total savings (US$56, or 5.7% of the 2.6 million UGX average cumula-
tive savings in 25%-vulnerable groups). They also disbursed approximately 350,000 fewer
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Table 7: Impact of group composition on total group savings and lending amounts
Dep var: row title (1) (2) (3)
Coefficient on 50% vulnerable group 
indicator reported
Panel A: Wave I
Cumulative savings 136,008 5,320 10,695
(125,510) (113,836) (118,074)
Avg. savings in 25% vulnerable groups 998,108 998,108 998,108
Cumulative loans 248,178 -75,379 -70,100
(262,756) (201,632) (204,994)
Avg. loans in 25% vulnerable groups 1,444,961 1,444,961 1,444,961
Number of groups 115 115 115
Panel B: Wave II
Cumulative savings 98,315 -434,835* -411,560*
(190,389) (237,704) (241,299)
Avg. savings in 25% vulnerable groups 2,148,276 2,148,276 2,148,276
Cumulative loans -522,022 -898,596* -863,769
(400,436) (532,599) (569,741)
Avg. loans in 25% vulnerable groups 3,307,929 3,307,929 3,307,929
Number of groups 102 102 102
Panel C: End of cycle
Cumulative savings 1,515 -147,372 -111,116
(195,773) (207,185) (200,480)
Avg. savings in 25% vulnerable groups 2,594,447 2,594,447 2,594,447
Cumulative loans -342,564 -350,351 -85,379
(450,878) (506,318) (491,213)
Avg. loans in 25% vulnerable groups 4,104,421 4,104,421 4,104,421
Return on savings -0.976 -1.184 -0.633
(1.269) (1.159) (1.063)
Has loans past due 0.009 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Number of groups 110 110 110
F-test results: 50% vulnerable estimate in wave II = end of cycle
Savings (p-value) 0.50 0.23 0.24
Loans (p-value) 0.75 0.31 0.19
N. meetings NO YES YES
IP f.e. NO YES YES
Rules f.e. NO NO YES
Table reports coefficients on the indicator for 50% vulnerable groups, from group level regressions, as in
equation (2). Each cell is a separate regression. Cumulative savings and cumulative loans in UGX, aggregated
from individual savings and loans after trimming top 1% of savings, loans and loan to savings ratios. Return
on savings (panel C) calculated at shareout. Default regressions (Panel C) run at the individual (i.e., member
of VSLA) level. “Has loans past due” is dummy for whether the participant failed to repay a loan in its
entirety by shareout. Rules fixed effects include dummies for the interest rate and the share price. Number
of groups differ in each wave because not all groups were audited in each wave. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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shillings in loans (US$130, or 8.5% of the 4.1 million cumulative loans in 25%-vulnerable
groups). Neither result is statistically significant. Controlling for IP, interest rates and
prices (column 3), the coefficient estimates become even smaller, and differences in loans all
but vanish. However, due to large confidence bands, we also cannot reject the possibility that
our estimates are similar to those in panel B. The rest of panel C looks at other end-of-cycle
outcomes. Return on savings earned at share out and a measure of default are similar across
the two types of groups.25
In summary, differences in the group composition translated into differences in the ability
to generate savings and provide loans to the groups members. These differences are more
pronounced during the central part of the groups’ operating cycle. The incentive to save
(given by the return on savings and the probability of default of other members) is the same
between the two types of groups.26
6.2 Individual savings and borrowing behavior
We next turn to the savings and borrowing decisions of study participants. Table 8 reports
estimates of equation (3) on individual-level cumulative savings and cumulative loans of
preselected participants. Because of random assignment, these estimates are the causal
impact of assignment to a more vulnerable group on realized savings and borrowing. As
in Table 7, we report three separate specifications: one with no controls, one with IP fixed
effects and number of meetings, and one adding rule dummies. We focus our attention on
the last two specifications.
Panel A reports savings and borrowing as recorded during the first audit wave. Assign-
ment to a more vulnerable group has no effect on the savings decision of preselected members,
but it does decrease their level of borrowing (14,000 fewer shillings, corresponding to $5.25,
or 28% of average borrowing among preselected in 25%-vulnerable groups, significant at
10% level). By the second audit visit, differences are more evident, both on the saving and
borrowing side. Cumulative savings (resp. cumulative borrowing) is 17,000 to 21,000 UGX
(resp. 54,000 to 64,000 UGX) lower among those who were assigned to more vulnerable
groups. These are large differences: a reduction in accumulated savings of 17,000 UGX (US$
25 Return on savings is measured as rBS , where r is the interest rate on loans, B is aggregate end-of-cycle
borrowing and S is aggregate end-of-cycle savings. Default is measured at the individual member level, as
as an indicator for whether the person failed to repay a loan completely by the end of the cycle.
26 The result on defaults (which we proxy by the share of loans in arrears at the end of the cycle) is in
contrast with Greaney et al. (2016), who argue theoretically that poorer people are more likely to default on
their loans, and therefore groups composed of a larger fraction of poor households will have lower repayment
rates.
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Table 8: Impact of group composition on savings and borrowing; Preselected onlyImpact of gr up c mposition n savings and le ding amounts f preselect d
Dep var: row title (1) (2) (3)
Coeff on 50% vulnerable group reported
Panel A: Wave I
Cumulative savings 5,509 -2,484 -2,404
(6,512) (4,131) (4,084)
Observations 940 930 930
Avg. outcome in 25%  vulnerable groups 33578 33578 33578
Cumulative loans 2,187 -14,439* -13,871*
(11,927) (7,496) (7,255)
Observations 942 932 932
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 49201 49201 49201
Panel B: Wave II
Cumulative savings 3,782 -21,139*** -17,617**
(8,353) (7,245) (7,959)
Observations 839 805 805
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 77322 77322 77322
Cumulative loans -39,631* -63,799*** -54,236***
(19,912) (14,047) (14,938)
Observations 848 805 805
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 129338 129338 129338
Panel C: End of cycle
Cumulative savings -2,109 -15,390** -9,545
(9,654) (7,216) (8,269)
Observations 897 897 897
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 94613 94613 94613
Cumulative loans -26,915 -42,750*** -20,149
(20,878) (12,506) (21,898)
Observations 897 897 897
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 152402 152402 152402
F-test results: coeff on 50% vulnerable in wave II = end of cycle
Savings (p-value) 0.48 0.63 0.31
Loans (p-value) 0.52 0.14 0.02
N. meetings NO YES YES
IP f.e. NO YES YES
Rules f.e. NO NO YES
Regressions on the sample of preselected participantsonly. Eachcell reports the coefficient on
theassignment to a50% vulnerablegroup. Dependentvariables are in UGX. Rules fixed effects
include interest rate andsharepricedummies. Errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.40) corresponds to 22% of mean savings in 25%-vulnerable groups, and a reduction in
accumulated loans of 54,000 UGX (US$20.30) corresponds to 42% of mean cumulative loans
in 25%-vulnerable groups.
Similarly to the aggregate results, the gap in individual savings and borrowing levels
narrows significantly by share out. Controlling only for IP and dates, in more vulnerable
groups cumulative savings are 15,400 UGX (US$5.80, or 16% of mean cumulative savings
in 25%-vulnerable groups) lower and cumulative borrowing is 42,750 UGX (US$16, or 28%
of mean borrowing in 25%-vulnerable groups) lower. When rules are taken into account,
estimates fall by half and become significantly noisier. In this last case, we can reject that
the coefficient on “cumulative loans” in panel C is the same as in panel B, which implies that
preselected in 50% vulnerable groups “catch up” with preselected in 25% vulnerable groups
between wave II and share out.
Table 9 reports coefficient estimates from regressions (3) with other sets of end-of-cycle
outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 report the loan-to-savings ratio and show that borrowers in
more vulnerable groups may have more difficulty leveraging their savings. Columns 3 and 4
show that the intervention did not affect the decision to become a borrower, although it may
have reduced the number of loans (columns 5 and 6) and not just the average size of those
loans (columns 7 and 8). Columns 9 and 10 report the fraction of loans in arrears. As in the
aggregate, we find no difference across types of groups in this measure. The last two columns
construct a measure of the money received at share out (i.e. the share-out value),27 finding
that the average share out in more vulnerable groups is 17,625 UGX lower (corresponding
to US$6.25, or 16.2% of the average value in 25%-vulnerable groups). In general, we find
that most results are sensitive to the inclusion of share price and interest rate, and after
controlling for these rules one can conclude that performance at share out was no worse in
more vulnerable groups.
Finally, Table 10 replicates Table 8 using the sample of self-selected participants. Across
all specifications and reporting periods, we see that neither savings nor borrowing levels differ
significantly across treatment arms. This result cannot be interpreted causally, because self-
selected participants are by definition not subject to random assignment. It is, however,
consistent with the idea that the effect of our intervention is stronger on the most vulnerable
households.
27 Our audit data do not contain direct measurement of share out. Our proxy for share out to individual i
is constructed using the formula (1 + rBS )si, where si is total end-of-cycle savings for person i, B and S are
aggregate borrowing and savings, and r is the interest on loans.
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Table 9: Other individual outcomes within savings groups; Preselected only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep vars: end of cycle outcomes Loan to savings ratio Has at least one loan Number of loans
50% vulnerable group -0.215* -0.132 -0.035 -0.021 -0.295* -0.093
(0.128) (0.147) (0.041) (0.040) (0.165) (0.183)
Interest rate =5% 0.298 0.116*** 0.979
(0.377) (0.030) (0.711)
Interest rate =10% -0.038 0.112** 1.279*
(0.344) (0.050) (0.642)
Interest rate =20% -0.691 0.068 -0.396
(0.431) (0.067) (1.023)
Share =1,000 UGX -0.123 -0.002 0.148
(0.146) (0.042) (0.546)
Share =2,000 UGX -0.406 0.193*** 0.515
(0.518) (0.051) (0.597)
Observations 896 896 896 896 844 844
R-squared 0.085 0.095 0.135 0.148 0.380 0.399
IP f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mean outcome in 25% groups 1.666 1.666 0.900 0.900 2.744 2.744
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dep vars: end of cycle outcomes Average loan size Has loans past due Shareout value
50% vulnerable group -15,398** -8,412 -0.000 -0.000 -17,625** -9,631
(6,816) (7,623) (0.012) (0.014) (7,802) (9,578)
Interest rate =5% -15,912** 0.037* 29,868
(7,607) (0.021) (23,668)
Interest rate =10% -28,785*** 0.014 49,629*
(10,429) (0.021) (27,084)
Interest rate =20% -110,925*** 0.025 -41,678
(17,506) (0.049) (29,922)
Share =1,000 UGX 5,635 -0.006 27,622***
(9,072) (0.006) (8,312)
Share =2,000 UGX 32,090* -0.021 84,984***
(18,736) (0.088) (21,966)
Observations 754 754 917 917 897 897
R-squared 0.190 0.222 0.119 0.121 0.264 0.314
IP f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mean outcome in 25% groups 60534 60534 0.0157 0.0157 107,191 107,191
Individual regressions on the sample of preselected participants only using data from the last wave of group audit data. Column title is the dependent 
variable.  All regressions estimated using OLS. Loan to savings ratio is cumulative loans divided by cumulative savings for each individual. Has one 
loan is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a person obtained one loan or more, and zero if the person never borrowed. Number of loans is cumulative 
number of individual loans.  Average loan size is the cumulative loan divided by the number of loans. Has loan past due is an indicator variable equal 
to one if a person failed to repay  all loans in their entirety by shareout. Shareout value is the estimated shareout value--see main text for the 
equation. All regressions include number of meetings and implementing partner fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Impact of group composition on savings and borrowing; Self-selected only
TAB]
Page PAGE]
Dep var: row title (1) (2) (3)
Coeff on 50% vulnerable group reported
Panel A: Wave I
Cumulative savings 7,429 -1,053 383
(7,151) (4,485) (4,276)
Observations 2,122 2,106 2,106
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 38684 38684 38684
Cumulative loans 17,716 -2,241 -1,000
(14,857) (7,653) (7,747)
Observations 2,125 2,109 2,109
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 55812 55812 55812
Panel B: Wave II
Cumulative savings 6,670 -12,671 -8,212
(9,773) (9,662) (9,748)
Observations 1,947 1,902 1,902
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 82097 82097 82097
Cumulative loans -6,944 -20,813 -16,974
(20,069) (22,660) (24,265)
Observations 1,965 1,902 1,902
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 123349 123349 123349
Panel C: End of cycle
Cumulative savings 7,339 2,454 4,194
(10,330) (7,303) (7,209)
Observations 2,000 2,000 2,000
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 94784 94784 94784
Cumulative loans 4,610 8,895 16,608
(22,296) (16,369) (18,851)
Observations 2,002 2,002 2,002
Avg. outcome in 25% vulnerable groups 148937 148937 148937
N. meetings NO YES YES
IP f.e. NO YES YES
Rules f.e. NO NO YES
Regressions on the sample of self-selected participants only. Each cell reports the coefficient on participation into a 
50% vulnerable group.  Dependent variables are in UGX. Rules fixed effects include interest rate and share price 
dummies. Errors clustered at the village  level in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.3 Robustness tests and other results
We run a number of alternative specifications for tables 7 and 8 (see web appendix tables
IV to IX). Results remain unchanged when the sample includes all SCORE beneficiaries or
trimmed data, when we control for baseline characteristics or month of data collection (to
control for seasonality), when we only consider IPs supervising both types of groups, when
we only consider VSLAs for which we have three separate waves of data collection, when we
exclude the two groups that set a high interest rate (20%), when using WLS to rebalance
characteristics of preselected in 25% and 50% vulnerable groups.
We explore heterogeneity of impacts on borrowing and savings at share out in Table 11.
Looking at the interaction term, we see that food insecure households see a larger drop in
borrowing while households with disabilities save less when assigned to a more vulnerable
group. At least along some dimensions of vulnerability, thus, the effect of the intervention
may be stronger on households who are more vulnerable. Finally, for certain categories of
participants, the negative effect of inclusion in a more vulnerable group on their borrowing
levels is significant also at share out.
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Our empirical investigation can be summarized into three main points. First, our attempt
to generate groups with different vulnerability profiles largely succeeded. Second, more
vulnerable groups accumulated savings and disbursed loans at a slower pace during the
initial part of the cycle. Finally, being placed in a more vulnerable group caused randomly
assigned vulnerable members to save and borrow less in the middle of the cycle. By some
indications, they may have partially “caught up” by the end of the cycle. In this section, we
provide a discussion of the possible mechanisms at play.
7.1 Scarcity of funds
One explanation that is consistent with the results presented so far is the presence of dif-
ferential scarcity of funds between 25% and 50% vulnerable groups. More specifically, if
preselected vulnerable households are more likely to be net borrowers than self-selected
households, then more vulnerable groups generate fewer loanable funds. As a consequence,
preselected members of more vulnerable groups are less able to fully meet their borrowing
needs. Over time, because of the addition of new savings and the repayment of old loans,
both types of groups generate sufficient funds to meet the demand for loans of its members.
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Table 11: Heterogeneous treatment effects; Preselected only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep var: Cumulative savings (at shareout) Cumulative loans (at shareout)
Low income Bad situation Disability Low income Bad situation Disability
-12,059 -9,796 -2,420 -7,697 -8,220 -16,689 -18,706 -14,478 11,181 -24,145
(9,200) (8,654) (8,650) (10,472) (8,577) (28,239) (23,965) (25,308) (22,679) (21,890)











X disability (9,947) (24,420)








Observations 897 895 895 893 897 897 895 895 893 897
R-squared 0.293 0.290 0.296 0.292 0.290 0.219 0.218 0.219 0.223 0.218
P-value of F-test: Indicated vulnerability estimate=0 in 50% vulnerable groups


























Regressions on preselected participants only using end of cycle data. Controls include number of meetings
in the cycle, IP fixed effects and rule dummies. Interaction variables are: below preselected median income
(columns 1 and 7), being identified as living "in a bad situation" or "in a critical situation" by the assessor
(columns 2 and 8), Having a disabled person in the household (columns 4 and 9) and scoring above median
in the vulnerability index (columns 5 and 10). Other interaction variables presented in web appendix tables
VIII and IX. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The difference between groups, as well as the difference in behavior between preselected
members, thus may fade over time. Note also that differences in savings behavior in the
two treatment arms cannot be explained by differences in the return on savings, because
the return on savings is the same (see Table 7). However, to the extent that a member of a
VSLA needs to save before she can borrow, the fact that preselected save less when placed
in more vulnerable groups may be driven by the fact that they expect to borrow less. This
leads to an interesting amplification effect: expecting funds to be scarce, members decrease
their level of savings, making funds scarcity even more severe.
Our results suggest that the burden of rationing may be shared unevenly among the
groups members. The fact that self-selected members do not seem to react to increases in
loanable funds suggests that they may be meeting their demand for loans in both types of
groups.28 On the other hand, preselected members react dramatically to a change in group’s
composition, implying they are rationed out when placed in more vulnerable groups. Note
also that this effect is stronger for more vulnerable preselected. Overall, it seems that when
funds are scarce, groups privilege less vulnerable households in their allocation of funds, and
rationing affects disproportionately vulnerable members.29
Importantly, our explanation relies on preselected vulnerable household being net bor-
rowers relative to other group participants, so that when their number increases the degree
of funds scarcity in a VSLA becomes more severe. We cannot test this hypothesis directly,
because we do not observe the demand for loans of our study participants but only their
realized borrowing—which is a function of their demand and the degree of scarcity. However,
the lower the degree of scarcity, the closer realized demand will be to actual demand. If the
degree of funds scarcity in 25% vulnerable groups is sufficiently low, we should observe that
the level of net borrowing (i.e. realized borrowing minus savings) of preselected in these
gruops groups is above that of their fellow members.
Table 12 provides evidence consistent with this. In this table we regress four measures of
financial outcomes at share out (savings, borrowing, loan to savings ratio, and net borrow-
ings) on the preselected indicator and savings group fixed effect. In 25% vulnerable groups
preselected net borrowing are positive and larger than that of self selected. In 50% vulnera-
ble groups, where scarcity is more severe, the net borrowing of preselected and self selected
are similar. To the extent that the self-selected satify their demands for loans in both types
of groups, these observations are consistent with the latent demand for loans of preselected
28 A caveat applies because we do not control the process of self selection.
29 This is consistent with the direct observation of the authors. Informal discussions with some VSLA
members suggest that, in case of scarcity of funds, priority is given to individuals based on their cumulative
savings with the group.
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being larger than that of self-selected.
Table 12: Mechanisms: Net borrowing positions within groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Savings (UGX)
A. All groups
Preselected -6,752** -4,270 0.020 2,464
(3,119) (7,065) (0.047) (6,061)
Observations 2,897 2,899 2,896 2,897
B. 25% vulnerable groups only
Preselected -1,134 12,719* 0.088 13,821**
(4,411) (6,788) (0.068) (6,040)
1,502 1,504 1,501 1,502
C. 50% vulnerable groups only
Preselected -11,008*** -17,147 -0.031 -6,139
(3,951) (10,483) (0.069) (9,341)
1,395 1,395 1,395 1,395
P-value of F-test: Coefficient in 50% vulnerable = Coefficient in 25% vulnerable
0.0169 0.007 0.0961 0.0391
Mean for self-selected 97,750 150,798 1.642 53,032
VSLA f.e. YES YES YES YES




Loan to savings 
ratio
UGX Net borrowing 
(Loans- Savings)
Each cell is the result of an OLS regression on preselected status dummy, inclusive of group fixed
effects. All outcomes measured at endline. Errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Another piece of evidence in support for this mechanism comes from the fact that there
were some significant differences in satisfaction with the availability of loans across treat-
ment arms. As part of our endline data collection, we asked respondents to report their
satisfaction level with the functioning of their group. Table 13 estimates the difference in
satisfaction between preselected members of 25% and 50% vulnerable groups. Preselected
members of more vulnerable groups are significantly less likely to be satisfied of the amount
borrowed by others (column 4). This is driven entirely by individuals who think that others
were borrowing too much, rather than borrowing too little (columns 5 and 6), which is con-
sistent with our preferred mechanism, i.e., preselected are rationed out of resources in more
vulnerable groups. They also report being more satisfied of the way records are kept in more
vulnerable groups (column 1), but this result is not significant once we adjust the standard
errors to account for multiple hypothesis testing. Overall, preselected in more vulnerable
groups report lower satisfaction. We can see that in column 11, which combines measures
of satisfaction in one normalized index. On average, placement in a more vulnerable group
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reduces satisfaction by a large and significant 0.35 standard deviations.30
7.2 Group cohesion
An alternative and plausible explanation is that our results are driven by differences in initial
levels of social cohesion and trust within the group. For example, at first members may not
be sure whether others will repay their loans, or whether the people in charge of keeping the
safe will steal the money. Over time, they learn that their fellow members are trustworthy
and start both saving and borrowing more. The speed at which they learn about their fellow
members may be determined by the initial within-group social network structure. If fewer
initial social connections exist in more vulnerable groups, trust may evolve more slowly there.
To check this possibility, we use data on initial social connections from a subsample of
participants, and check whether social connections vary across treatment types (table 14).
We thus estimate equation (1) on social connection variables: the number of relatives and
neighbors in the group (columns 1 and 2), and the number of participants who are visited
at home, who are given advice, to whom advice is sought (columns 3-5).31 Note that the
first two measures are predetermined and time invariant: the fact that the information was
collected after groups are formed is irrelevant. The latter set of measures, instead, may have
been affected by the treatment in ambiguous ways. For instance, a person who has many
friends in the savings group may report a large number of household visits, but so would a
person who has few acquaintances and is trying to create them.
In the first two columns of panel A, the coefficient on Preselected is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that the preselected have fewer baseline connections than self-selected.
Coefficients on 50% V ulnerable Group indicates that there are differences in the connection
between self-selected across treatments: those in more vulnerable groups are less likely to
report having neighbors. This is consistent with them having fewer opportunities to join
with acquaintances, as the number of slots available are fewer in more vulnerable groups.
30 The precision of the result is driven by dissatisfaction with borrowing by others documented in columns
4-6. Interestingly, however, the coefficient estimate remains very similar (-0.30) if we exclude that measure
from the index, although the p-value of the coefficient increases to 0.106. It should be noted that participants
report extremely high levels of satisfaction (over 90% of participants reporting being neutral or satisfied)
with all aspects of the group activities. It is possible that such high reported satisfaction is driven not only
by the value attached to participation in group activities, but also by reporting bias which, if present, would
attenuate estimated differences between treatments towards zero.
31 The use of social connections data requires some caution, as the sample of respondents is not unbalanced
across treatments. To partially address this problem, we run WLS using the predicted likelihood of being
interviewed. See web appendix for a detailed description of the method and an explanation of how this
approach does not completely eliminate the imbalance.
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Table 13: Self-reported measures of satisfaction with group; Preselected only at endline
Indicator variables for:
Respondent is satisfied with: Respondent thinks that:
Good Good Amt Others Others
record group Amt saved borrowed borrow borrow
quality attendance by others by others too much too little
Sample: Preselected in savings groups only
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group 0.0575** -0.0163 -0.0279 -0.0496*** 0.0399** 0.00286
(0.0265) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0186) (0.0180) (0.00515)
Adjusted significance level 10% No No
Observations 731 733 727 729 729 729
R-squared 0.092 0.172 0.102 0.107 0.073 0.165
Avg. outcome for 25% vulnerable group 0.952 0.952 0.948 0.980 0.00 0.0195
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Indicator variables for:
Respondent is satisfied with:
Expected
Loan Insurance Own more Index of
allocation allocation savings at shareout satisfaction
Sample: Preselected in savings groups only
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group -0.0260 -0.0198 -0.0211 0.0118 -0.345**
(0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0303) (0.0512) -0.147
Adjusted significance level No
Observations 730 729 733 658 648
R-squared 0.131 0.099 0.168 0.195 0.233
Avg. outcome for 25% vulnerable group 0.957 0.983 0.899 0.288 -0.0302
Weighted least squares regression with attrition weights on preselected only. Each regression includes month
of interview dummy and household controls (I.e. vulnerability variables). Dependent Variables: Column 1
and 2: Indicator equal to 1 if respondent believed that records or attendance were satisfactory, and zero
otherwise. Columns 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9: indicators equal to one if respondent is "satisfied" or "neutral", and
zero if respondent is "dissatisfied". Columns 5 and 6: indicator is one if respondent was dissatisfied with
amount borrowed by others and indicated that others borrowed too much or too little. Column 10: Indicator
equal to 1 if expected more money at shareout, 0 if expected less or same. Column 11: index from principal
component analysis of satisfaction indicators from columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and an indicator for expecting the
same or more at shareout. The index is normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
1. Errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. Adjusted significance level uses Benjamini-Hochberg
step-up method; family of regressors includes columns 1-4 and 7-10. Columns 5, 6 and 11 are unadjusted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Finally, there do not appear to be significant differences in the number of relatives and ac-
quaintances for the preselected. Panel B pools preselected and self selected from the same
group. On average, members of more vulnerable groups report having fewer connections
with other group members.
Table 14: Mechanisms: Social connections at baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep var: number of 
















Panel A: Differences across group type and selection
Preselected -0.240* -0.697*** -0.060 0.027 -0.053 -0.055 -0.133***
(0.136) (0.142) (0.125) (0.079) (0.094) (0.044) (0.036)
50% vulnerable -0.281 -0.564* -0.170 -0.005 -0.093 -0.044 -0.028
(0.175) (0.312) (0.146) (0.088) (0.105) (0.059) (0.040)
Preselected X 50% 
vulnerable group
0.149 0.371 0.305 0.061 0.114 0.089 0.010
(0.204) (0.222) (0.183) (0.115) (0.129) (0.065) (0.050)
Observations 2,270 2,269 2,298 2,298 2,298 2,298 2,299
R-squared 0.135 0.100 0.163 0.146 0.105 0.201 0.174
Panel B: Difference by group type
50% vulnerable group -0.290* -0.627* -0.008 0.043 -0.045 -0.012 -0.077*
(0.152) (0.314) (0.134) (0.073) (0.083) (0.054) (0.041)
Observations 2,270 2,269 2,298 2,298 2,298 2,298 2,299
R-squared 0.133 0.091 0.158 0.144 0.104 0.200 0.152
Mean outcome in 
25% vulnerable 1.336 2.345 1.047 0.563 0.482 0.628 0.886
Regressions on sample of VSLA participants who were interviewed after group formation and inclusive of IP
fixed effects. Observations weighted by the likelihood of being interviewed (see web appendix). Weighted
means reported in last column. Errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Does the fact that more vulnerable groups are less connected explain our main results?
In Table 15 we replicate Table 8 while controlling for individual- and group-level measures
of social connections. We first report the estimates of equation (3) (without social network
regressors) in column 1. Treatment effects are similar to those in table 8. The remaining
columns include socialization regressors. While significance levels differ, taken together, the
regressions suggest that the initial social network structure of a group influences lending and
borrowing in interesting ways. Borrowing and savings by preselected participants increase
with the number of own connections, but decrease with the groups’ average. This is consistent
with a form of “competition for loans” in which personal connections allow members to borrow
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more, but less so if other group’s members have a lot of personal connections as well.
Importantly, note that the inclusion of our measures of socialization have a very limited
impact on the coefficient estimates on 50% V ulnerable Group. Thus, while within-group
social networks seem to be important in the allocation of loans and the savings decisions, it
cannot explain the difference in behavior generated in our experiment.
7.3 Differences in the demand for loans
It is also possible that our intervention affected the demand for loans of preselected. For
example, preselected in less vulnerable groups may be more likely to learn from a self-selected
member how to run a business, and therefore are more likely to demand a loan to the group.
Similarly, group participation may have an impact on the group members social network,
and on the business opportunities available to them. These mechanisms, however, are hard
to reconcile with the fact that the difference between the borrowing levels of preselected
in the two types of groups disappears over time. They should operate during the entire
cycle and, if anything, should become stronger the longer groups members interact with one
another. Hence, while these mechanisms may affect the latent demand for loans, whether
this demand is satisfied depends on the degree of funds scarcity.
Finally, members participating in other SCORE activities may act as a coalition and
influence the groups’ decision process. As a consequence, more vulnerable groups may op-
erate in ways that are more favorable to vulnerable members. As discussed previously, the
intervention had little effect on the rules adopted by the group. Furthermore, looking at
loans usage data, we find no difference in the projects started by preselected in the two types
of groups. Because the group should agree with the purpose of each loan, this evidence again
suggests that the fraction of vulnerable in a group does not affect the group’s decisions.
8 Welfare effects
The final objective of the study is to explore whether ultra-poor households fare better when
they join less vulnerable savings groups. Whether this is the case is likely to depend on the
mechanisms discussed above. In less vulnerable groups, vulnerable households are better
able to access loans when encountering shocks or investment opportunities. Less vulnerable
groups may also provide access to better social networks and more opportunities to be
inspired or learn from successful peers. For all these reasons, our preselected participants
assigned to 25% vulnerable groups may report different outcomes—rates of business and
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Table 15: Mechanisms: the role of social connections
Neighbors Relatives Seeks advice Gives advice
Panel A: Wave I
Cumulative 50% vulnerable -89 -298 -269 404 250 722
savings group (4,490) (4,667) (4,488) (4,471) (4,427) (4,598)
Average socialization -250 -462 1,551 4,190 -287
(1,489) (1,493) (3,733) (5,882) (5,929)
Own socialization 152 8 405 184 1,581
(558) (456) (1,128) (1,417) (1,604)
Cumulative 50% vulnerable -17,700* -22,830*** -19,717** -17,036* -18,391** -16,706*
loans group (9,344) (8,390) (9,225) (9,379) (9,106) (9,208)
Average socialization -6,703 -5,609* -6,079 11,010 -487
(4,168) (2,847) (13,828) (17,343) (14,846)
Own socialization 1,892 1,119 -1,981 -2,245 7,872
(1,279) (1,376) (3,203) (4,535) (4,863)
Panel B: Wave II
Cumulative 50% vulnerable -15,438 -11,754 -15,824 -15,331 -15,339 -16,497
savings group (12,348) (11,254) (12,347) (12,306) (12,031) (12,100)
Average socialization 3,871 -1,024 -19,686** -9,718 -21,131
(3,892) (2,797) (8,676) (16,568) (12,765)
Own socialization 138 -457 675 3,672 3,930
(1,492) (1,190) (2,559) (3,306) (3,535)
Cumulative 50% vulnerable -62,744*** -63,406*** -70,427*** -63,877*** -66,234*** -64,147***
loans group (22,279) (21,311) (21,785) (21,359) (21,925) (22,523)
Average socialization -1,147 -19,311** -32,857* -3,755 -7,660
(7,556) (9,439) (17,299) (30,358) (26,461)
Own socialization 2,137 3,070 2,806 17,010 17,961*
(2,341) (2,904) (6,722) (11,483) (10,418)
Panel C: End of cycle
Cumulative 50% vulnerable -3,698 -5,825 -5,389 -3,542 -2,148 -4,637
savings group (9,689) (9,998) (9,628) (9,743) (9,612) (9,787)
Average socialization -2,557 -4,158 -15,449* -18,449 -25,681**
(3,028) (3,200) (7,917) (13,098) (10,911)
Own socialization -364 -586 2,370 3,416 2,875
(1,323) (1,252) (2,144) (3,013) (2,967)
Cumulative 50% vulnerable -39,539 -46,485** -43,106* -39,586 -39,394* -36,282
loans group (24,364) (23,087) (24,167) (24,718) (23,019) (24,132)
Average socialization -11,054 -9,372 -32,794* 8,795 14,237
(8,424) (7,837) (19,115) (33,142) (33,987)
Own socialization 5,774** 3,586 673 17,440 15,590
(2,828) (3,159) (7,148) (10,487) (10,196)
Column titles are covariates: Number of 





“Average socialization” is the weighted group-level average of “own socialization”. Dates, IP, and rules
controls included. All regressions estimated using WLS, with weights being the predicted probability of
being interviewed with the social connections module. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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household investment, consumption, labor supply—than those assigned to 50% vulnerable
groups. We check whether this is the case by estimating equation (3) on endline households’
characteristics, and report the results in Appendix B Tables B7 to B9. In each table, panel
A reports estimates from the full sample of preselected, while panel B limits the sample
to VSLA members only. In general, estimates in panel B are larger and more likely to be
significant than those from panel A, consistent with treatment effects operating through
participation in VSLAs.
Table B5 studies the effect of the intervention on households’ investments. VSLA mem-
bers enrolled in a more vulnerable group invested a lower amount in housing improvements
during the previous year (column 1). On the other hand, the assignment to a more vulnera-
ble group has no predictive power over investment in productive assets or activities such as
farming (column 2), new microenterprises creation (column 3), or land cultivation (columns
6-8). While productive activities seem unaffected by the intervention, a potential benefit of
joining a less vulnerable group is protection against unlikely but expensive shocks. In favor
of this view, we find that members of more vulnerable groups are more likely to report having
sold land in the previous year (column 5). Consistent with the view that the intervention
did not spur increases in production, Table B6 reports regressions on weekly hours worked
in the previous month and finds no differences in work hours or earnings between the two
treatment arms. Table B7 finds no significant effect of the intervention on savings amounts
or asset accumulation.
We also asked the respondents to explain whether members of their households participate
in other social groups (Table B8). We find that group assignment did not have a differential
effect on the probability of joining farm training programs (known locally as farmers field
schools or FFS), women groups, financial groups such as ROSCAs, insurance groups, or other
types of social groups. On the other hand, those assigned to more vulnerable groups are
significantly more likely to be members of other savings groups. This is consistent with the
idea that preselected in more vulnerable groups are less able to meet their demand for loans,
and respond by joining other VSLAs. Overall, social group participation outside of the study
VSLA is not significantly more prevalent in either type of treatment group (column 7).
Finally, while our survey instrument lacked a consumption module, we had a food inse-
curity module (Table B9). Across the five measures of food insecurity, estimates are negative
for participants of more vulnerable groups. However, all of these measures are insignificant.
Overall, the endline results paint a nuanced picture of the effect of the intervention. For
the most part, being assigned to a more vulnerable group has small but significant negative
effects. Relative to preselected in 25% vulnerable groups, preselected in 50% vulnerable
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groups were able to make additional investments in their housing structure, and perhaps
avoided (relatively rare) dramatic events such as selling land. They are also less likely
to participate in other VSLAs. We find no evidence that a “better” social group inspires
vulnerable participants to work more, to invest in productive activities, or to participate in
other social groups (with the exception of other VSLAs).
It is important to keep in mind two things. First, the endline evaluation was done rela-
tively shortly after groups were formed. It may therefore miss the impact of the intervention
if the benefit from being in a less vulnerable group (i.e., less constrained access to loans,
better social networks) take some time to fully realize. Second, the estimates presented here
are differences between the two treatment arms, and tell us nothing about the benefit of
participation into a savings group.
9 Conclusion
This paper shows that the ability of a savings group to provide credit to its members –
especially those who are vulnerable – depends on its composition. Initially, demand for
loans is likely to be larger than the availability of funds. Groups accumulate funds over time
and may eventually able to meet this demand. However, the speed of funds accumulation
(and the duration of rationing) depends on the composition of savings groups. Whenever the
proportion of ultra-poor, vulnerable members of the group increases, fund scarcity increases,
savings accumulation slows and the group is less able to meet demand for loans.
Our results open several questions and potential concerns. First, our study may suggest
that groups composed exclusively of self-selected members are better able to satisfy the
demand for loans of their members. If this is the case, however, one concern is that fully
self-selected groups may contain few ultra-poor vulnerable members, which would imply a
trade off between financial inclusion of ultra-poor households and the well functioning of a
savings group. On the brighter side, we also believe that, if such trade off exists, it can be
made less stringent by improving the rules of functioning of a savings group. For example,
savings groups could reward early savings, and/or auction off scarce funds (similarly to what
is done in bidding ROSCAs), or obtain liquidity through bank loans. Addressing these
questions and concerns is left for future work.
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A Appendix: Vulnerability Measures
• Indicators that are specific to households with children:
child labor: whether the child has been involved in child labor.
drug abuse: whether the child ever been involved in drug consumption (petroleum sniffing,
glue sniffing, etc).
quality diet: child usually (i.e. at least 3 times a week) eats three categories of food: “energy
food” (rich in carbohidrates); “bodybuilding food” (rich in protein), and “protective
foods” (fruits and vegetables). Indicator is 0-3 scale, with one point assigned to each
category.
number of daily meals: “How many times does the child have meals in a day?”
orphaned child in household: whether there is an orphan (maternal, paternal or both)
in the household.
• Indicators that are relevant to all households:
chronic disease: whether the child, any of the parents/guardians has a chronic disease
(HIV/AIDS, sickle cells, Epilepsy, etc).
disability: whether the child, any of the parents/guardians is deaf, blind or has other
physical or mental disabilities.
food insecure: “Are there times when your household goes without meals due to failure to
get food?” answer is “yes”.
informal employment and casual labor: “What is your household’s main source of
income?” answer is “informal employment” or “casual labor”
household unemployment: "What is your household’s main source of income?" answer
is “unemployed” or “remittances”
safe source of water: “What is the main source of drinking water for members of your
household?” answers are “Piped, bore-hole, harvesting” (coded as safe) and “surface”
(coded as not safe).
access to latrines: "Do you have Latrine facilities?" answers are "yes (private or shared)"
and "no".
income per capita: Self-reported household income divided by the number of household
members.
assessor scale: assessor’s general impression of the household. Coded 0 ("good situation–
can manage without support"), 1 ("fair situation–can be considered for support"), 2
("Bad situation–should be considered for support") and 3 ("critical situation–eligible
for support").
household size: "How many people live in your household?"
vulnerability index: First component of principal component analysis of: household dis-
ability, child labor, drug abuse at home, income per capita, food insecure, assessor scale,
informal employed, not employed, access to latrines, household size.
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internal: share out; external: loans
Any type of investment (Investment 
in existing business + buy farm in-
put + start new business + buy live-
stock + buy stock for resale + buy 
or rent land)
Any type of shock (health problems 
+ other temporary difficulties + un-
employment)
Consumption (consumption + 
household durables + other 
durables)
Risk sharing (Marriage, funeral, 
other ceremony +  gift and loans) 
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Table B2: Determinants of VSLA membership–Preselected only
(1) (2) (3)
50% vulnerable group 0.0238 0.0285
(0.0247) (0.0248)
Child labor -0.0497 -0.0520
(0.0322) (0.0322)
Drug abuse at home 0.0585 0.0547
(0.0414) (0.0415)
Chronic disease 0.0891** 0.0877**
(0.0364) (0.0363)
Disability in household 0.0220 0.0200
(0.0338) (0.0339)
Food insecure 0.0842*** 0.0825***
(0.0317) (0.0315)
Quality diet -0.0155 -0.0161
(0.0160) (0.0160)
Number of daily meals -0.0106 -0.0111
(0.0116) (0.0116)
Informal employment 0.0612** 0.0650**
(0.0288) (0.0289)
Household unemployed -0.000665 0.000510
(0.0396) (0.0394)
Orphaned child in hhld 0.0679** 0.0682**
(0.0268) (0.0268)
Access to latrines -0.0521 -0.0535
(0.0386) (0.0385)
Income per capita -2.86e-07 -1.68e-07
(3.60e-06) (3.61e-06)
Assessor scale -0.0164 -0.0172
(0.0303) (0.0303)




Vulnerability index -0.0140 -0.0117
(0.0427) (0.0428)
Constant 0.771*** 0.614*** 0.597***
(0.0202) (0.167) (0.167)
Observations 1,234 1,223 1,223
R-squared 0.001 0.044 0.045
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep var: Enrolled in a study 
VSLA
Notes: Regression is linear probability model. Sample of preselected only. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Results are robust to 
probit specification or inclusion of IP fixed effects. 
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Table B3: Financial access in study villages after one year
Financial access in study villages after one year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of SACCOs per Number of Number of Number of
Parish SACCOS in 1000 people VSLAs in Non-SCORE VSLAs SCORE VSLAs
VARIABLES Population parish in parish village in village in village
-964.3 0.0714 0.0184 -0.487 -0.103 -0.384
(668.0) (0.115) (0.0437) (0.577) (0.548) (0.250)
Constant 4,681*** 0.250*** 0.0750** 4.594*** 2.406*** 2.188***
(526.0) (0.0774) (0.0302) (0.419) (0.400) (0.187)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.023 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.024
Village assigned to 50% 
treatment
Unit of observation in all regressions is the village. Parishes are the smallest administrative unit and are
composed of multiple villages. Savings groups are counted within the village while other financial institutions
like SACCOs are counted within the parish. SACCOs are local credit unions. Linerar regression results
shown; results are robust to Poisson estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B4: Vulnerability profile at baseline: beneficiaries vs non-beneficiaries
VARIABLES Child labor Casual work
Beneficiary 0.113** 0.052** 0.129*** 0.232*** 0.194** -0.152** 0.136***
(0.048) (0.025) (0.038) (0.069) (0.076) (0.061) (0.046)
50% vulnerable group 0.022 0.012 0.059* 0.040 0.028 -0.038 0.030
(0.039) (0.025) (0.035) (0.044) (0.062) (0.038) (0.029)
Beneficiary X -0.041 0.019 -0.022 -0.064 -0.002 -0.070 0.002
50% vulnerable group (0.058) (0.036) (0.048) (0.074) (0.095) (0.071) (0.060)
Observations 2,735 2,470 2,469 2,474 2,686 2,741 2,741
R-squared 0.141 0.081 0.128 0.132 0.205 0.182 0.191
0.260 0.00765 0.0459 0.271 0.485 0.791 0.0999
VARIABLES Assessor scale Vulnerability index
Beneficiary 0.040 0.008 -0.116*** 0.522*** -4,014*** 0.272 0.887***
(0.029) (0.072) (0.035) (0.078) (1,245) (0.398) (0.196)
50% vulnerable group 0.013 0.085 -0.001 0.024 186 -0.196 0.163
(0.029) (0.067) (0.025) (0.089) (1,196) (0.288) (0.142)
Beneficiary X 0.055 0.091 0.000 0.013 977 -0.331 0.106
50% vulnerable group (0.045) (0.091) (0.060) (0.117) (1,861) (0.413) (0.243)
Observations 2,741 2,385 2,761 2,474 2,718 2,749 2,438
R-squared 0.130 0.359 0.122 0.200 0.139 0.038 0.256
0.0861 0.617 0.900 1.441 10386 6.430 -0.527
Disability in 
household
Drug abuse at 
home
















Number of hhld 
members
Mean dep. beneficiaries in 25% 
vulnerable groups
Regressions on sample of VSLA participant households only (preselected plus self-selected) and including IP fixed effects. Sample of preselected 
interviewed prior to group formation; sample of self-selected interviewed after group formation. Quality diet is a numerical score (0-3) with one point 
assigned to each different category of food eaten by children in the household. Assessor scale is numerical score (0 to 3) of vulnerability based on the direct 
observation of the assessor. Higher values is more vulnerable. Total score is overall score of vulnerability. Higher values are more vulnerable.  See 
Appendix A for all other definitions. Errors clustered at the village level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B6: Household labor supply and income at endline; Preselected only












Panel A: All preselected
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group -0.00942 0.00554 -0.123 -0.00268 -1,279
(0.0356) (0.0768) (0.149) (0.0919) (2,452)
Adjusted significance level
Observations 851 625 394 673 639
R-squared 0.235 0.242 0.350 0.259 0.178
Avg. outcome for 25% vulnerable group 0.859 33.87 39.10 57.84 15032
Panel B: Preselected in savings groups only
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group 0.0102 -0.0235 -0.0428 -0.0732 1,288
(0.0441) (0.0925) (0.179) (0.109) (3,087)
Adjusted significance level
Observations 665 473 309 512 484
R-squared 0.257 0.271 0.383 0.280 0.184
Household controls YES YES YES YES YES
Avg. outcome for 25% vulnerable group 0.848 34.34 38.80 59.22 12913
Weighted least squares regression with attrition weights on preselected only. Each regression includes month
of interview dummy. Household controls are vulnerability controls, plus age age squared and education level
of respondent. Log hours and household income are as reported by main respondent. All regressions with
IP fixed effects. “Adjusted significance level” is the significance level after adjusting for multiple comparisons
using the Benjamini-Hochberg step-up method, with regressions from columns 1-5 are in the same regression
family. We report only 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% adjusted significance levels. Errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8: Household participation in external social groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)















Panel A: All preselected
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group 0.00816 -0.00140 0.000900 0.0492 0.0988*** 0.0247 0.0999*
(0.0339) (0.0459) (0.0349) (0.0367) (0.0343) (0.0192) (0.0574)
Adjusted significance level 5% No
Observations 976 976 976 976 976 976 976
R-squared 0.127 0.114 0.164 0.346 0.199 0.125 0.209
Avg. outcome for 25% vulnerable group 0.0887 0.107 0.0907 0.188 0.100 0.0293 0.530
Panel B: Preselected in savings groups only
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group -0.0100 0.0143 -0.0505 0.0424 0.0990*** 0.0204 0.0490
(0.0406) (0.0486) (0.0441) (0.0413) (0.0285) (0.0237) (0.0631)
Adjusted significance level 1% No
Observations 788 788 788 788 788 788 788
R-squared 0.137 0.129 0.205 0.395 0.227 0.127 0.221
Household controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Avg. outcome for 25% vulnerable group 0.0922 0.106 0.104 0.194 0.0922 0.0348 0.549
Weighted least squares regression with attrition weights on preselected only. Each regression includes month of
interview dummy. Household controls are vulnerability variables. Dependent variables are indicators for whether a
memberof the household participantes ina social group.All regressionswith IP fixed effects. ``Adjustedsignificance
level''  is the significance level after adjusting for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg step-up method, 
with regressions from columns 1-6 in the same regression family. We report only 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% significance
levels. Column 7 is unadjusted. Errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weighted least squares regression with attrition weights on preselected only. Each regression includes month
of interview dummy. Household controls are vulnerability variables. Dependent variables are indicators
for whether a member of the household participantes in a social group. All regressions with IP fixed ef-
fects. “Adjusted significance level” is the significance level after adjusting for multiple comparisons using the
Benjamini-Hochberg step-up method, with regressions from columns 1-6 in the same regression family. We
report only 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% significance levels. Column 7 is unadjusted. Errors clustered at the village
level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B9: Household experience with food insecurityF od insecurity
Page 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)













Panel A: All preselected
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group -0.0820 -0.0686 -0.0178 -0.0700 -0.00464
(0.0558) (0.0501) (0.0470) (0.0571) (0.0508)
Adjusted significance level
Observations 969 961 960 960 954
R-squared 0.197 0.191 0.164 0.187 0.166
Avg. outcome for 25% vulnerable group 0.704 0.700 0.622 0.316 0.186
Panel B: Preselected in savings groups only
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group -0.101 -0.0891 -0.0300 -0.110* -0.0137
(0.0609) (0.0563) (0.0558) (0.0643) (0.0550)
Adjusted significance level
Observations 782 777 773 772 766
R-squared 0.215 0.215 0.179 0.205 0.181
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES
Avg. outcome for 25% vulnerable group 0.738 0.734 0.627 0.359 0.207
Weighted least squares regression with attrition weights on preselected only. Each regression includes
month of interview dummy. Household controls are vulnerability variables. All regressionswith IPfixed
effects. ``Adjusted significance level'' is the significance level after adjusting for multiple comparisons
using the Benjamini-Hochberg step-up method, with regressionsfrom columns1-5 in the same regression
family. We report only 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% adjusted significance levels. Errors clustered at the village 
Weighted least squares regression with attrition weights on preselected only. Each regression includes month
of interview dummy. Household controls are vulnerability variables. All regressions with IP fixed effects. “Ad-
justed significance level” is the significance level after adjusting for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-
Hochberg step-up method, with regressions from columns 1-5 in the same regression family. We report only
1%, 5%, 10%, 15% adjusted significance levels. Errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Social Connection Profile
At the time of the collection of the screening tool to community members, data collectors
administered an additional baseline interview module. This module included the following
questions on within-group social connections: the number of family members in the group;
the number of neighbors (living within 5 minutes walking distance from the respondent’s
dwelling) in the group; the list of names (if any) of people whom they “seek advice from”,
“give advice to,” and “visit at their home”, and whether those mentioned were members of
the group.
While all community participants responded to the social connections module at the time
of the elicitation of their vulnerability profile, for budgetary reasons we could not collect the
same information from all SCORE beneficiaries. We tracked and administered the additional
module to seven SCORE beneficiaries from each group. Because there are more beneficiaries
in more vulnerable groups, we interviewed fewer participants in those groups and the sample
is unbalanced (see Table II). We thus rebalance the sample by employing weighted least
squares, as in DiNardo et al. (1996). This method is similar to inverse probability weights
(see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) and is employed in other RCT studies to address attrition
(e.g., Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster et al., 2015).
Since the imbalance was driven by the lower likelihood of interviewing SCORE beneficia-
ries in more vulnerable groups, we generate predicted probabilities of not being interviewed
using a program beneficiary indicator, the assignment to 50% vulnerable treatment indica-
tor, and the interaction of the two (see table I). These are used as weights in a weighted
least square (WLS) estimation model.32 Table III reports results regarding within-groups
social connection with and without reweighting.
32 Another approach would be to use weights created from a model that includes the vulnerability baseline
variables; we tested the alternative approach and found that it was less successful in rebalancing the data.
C Web Appendix (not for publication) 56
Table I: Response to social network questions





50% vulnerable group 0.264
-0.182
SCORE beneficiary X 50% -1.037***




Dep. Var: Group participant 
interviewed 
Probit regressions on the sample of VSLA partici-
pants. Dependent variable is equal to one if par-
ticipant was interviewed after group formation, 0
otherwise. Errors clustered at the parish level in
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VSLA outcomes: Robustness checks
This section provides additional tables and robustness tests to the main regression tables in
the text.
• Table IV reports alternative specifications of Table 7, with all outcome variables ag-
gregated at the group level.
• Table V reproduces Table 8 using alternative samples.
• Table VI reproduces Table 8 using additional control variables.
• Table VII reproduces Table 8 but pools the second and third wave of data into a panel.
• Tables VIII and IX study heterogeneity outcomes for vulnerability variables not dis-
cussed in table 11 of main text.
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Table VI: Impact of composition on preselected–alternative controls
Table replicates last two columns of Table 8 with alternative sets of control variables. Columns 1 and 2
("Seasonality"): Adds month of audit fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 ("Vulnerability baseline controls"):
adds the vulnerability measures for each participant as controls; Columns 5 and 6 ("WLS"): Weighted least
squares, with inverse probability weights derived from a regression of vulnerability baseline controls on the
likelihood that the preselected joined the savings group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table VIII: Heterogeneous treatment effects (Savings): additional interaction terms
























50% vulnerable -7,392 -4,407 -11,520 -14,264 -2,347 -10,844 -21,693 -9,030 -7,323





































Observations 894 895 895 893 893 893 639 895 897
R-squared 0.292 0.294 0.290 0.293 0.300 0.292 0.331 0.290 0.293
0.181 0.0355 0.754 0.589 0.0155 0.825 0.220 0.258 0.183
50% vulnerable group X 
hhld unemployed
Hhld unemployed
P-value of F-test: Indicated vulnerability =0 in 50% vulnerable groups
50% vulnerable group X 
hhld size below median
Hhld size below median
50% vulnerable group X 
access to latrines
Access to latrines
50% vulnerable group X 
safe water
Safe source of water
50% vulnerable group X 
drug abuse
50% vulnerable group X 
child labor
50% vulnerable group X 
orphan hhld
Orphan hhld
50% vulnerable group X 
casual work
Casual work
50% vulnerable group X 
informal employment
Informal employment
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Table IX: Heterogeneous treatment effects (Loans): additional interaction terms
























50% vulnerable -12,264 -17,131 -26,974 -5,767 -8,185 -28,284 -51,896* -12,320 -26,847





































Observations 894 895 895 893 893 893 639 895 897
R-squared 0.223 0.219 0.222 0.225 0.229 0.227 0.252 0.219 0.226
0.0871 0.367 0.924 0.356 0.0951 0.151 0.0887 0.391 0.833
Casual work
50% vulnerable group X 
casual work
Hhld unemployed
P-value of F-test: Indicated vulnerability =0 in 50% vulnerable groups
Safe source of water
50% vulnerable group X 
safe water
Access to latrines
50% vulnerable group X 
access to latrines
Hhld size below median
50% vulnerable group X 
hhld size below median
50% vulnerable group X 
hhld unemployed
50% vulnerable group X 
drug abuse
50% vulnerable group X 
child labor
Orphan hhld
50% vulnerable group X 
orphan hhld
Informal employment
50% vulnerable group X 
informal employment
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Endline tables
In the main text, we use the baseline characteristics to generate predicted probabilities of not
being found in the endline, and use these as weights in a weighted least square (WLS) estima-
tion model. Table X shows that the probability of being interviewed at endline is correlated
with baseline characteristics. Here we report the OLS endline results using unweighted re-
gressions (OLS). For each outcome, we also report specifications without individual baseline
controls and without IP fixed effects.
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Table X: Endline attrition; Preselected onlyEndline attrition




Child labor -0.00960 -0.00703
(0.0357) (0.0363)
Drug abuse at home 0.0296 0.0342
(0.0732) (0.0721)
Chronic disease 0.0950** 0.0969**
(0.0415) (0.0413)
Child with disability 0.0240 0.0253
(0.0347) (0.0346)
Food insecure 0.0713 0.0731
(0.0460) (0.0456)
Quality diet 0.0101 0.0107
(0.0238) (0.0238)
Number of daily meals 0.0229 0.0236
(0.0228) (0.0226)
Informal employment -0.00564 -0.0102
(0.0361) (0.0368)
Household unemployed 0.0482 0.0469
(0.0568) (0.0570)
Orphaned child in hhld 0.106*** 0.106***
(0.0291) (0.0289)
Disabled child guardian 0.0381 0.0396
(0.0361) (0.0360)
Access to latrines 0.116** 0.116**
(0.0482) (0.0478)
Enumerator assessment: 0.000905 0.00268
 good/fair situation (0.0375) (0.0383)
Total vulnerability score -0.00428 -0.00437
(0.00290) (0.00289)
Monthly income -4.85e-07 -4.79e-07
(3.53e-07) (3.48e-07)
Constant 0.783*** 0.767*** 0.789***
(0.0346) (0.192) (0.193)
Observations 1,277 1,268 1,268
R-squared 0.000 0.044 0.045
Table reports outcomes from a linear probability model. Data on 
preselected only. Errors clustered at the parish level in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Assigned to 50% vulnerable group
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Table XVI: Endline unweighted regressions: Food security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
Panel A: All preselected
Assigned to 50% vulnerable -0.0288 -0.0551 -0.0908 0.0128 -0.0156 -0.0476 -0.0143 -0.0400 -0.00692
(0.0519) (0.0547) (0.0635) (0.0521) (0.0569) (0.0586) (0.0562) (0.0595) (0.0497)
Observations 976 846 846 968 840 840 967 841 841
R-squared 0.019 0.102 0.238 0.009 0.076 0.237 0.010 0.066 0.234
Avg. outcome for 25% group 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.687 0.687 0.687 0.633 0.633 0.633
Panel B: Sample of SBG members
Assigned to 50% vulnerable -0.0583 -0.0863 -0.123* -0.0152 -0.0476 -0.0822 -0.0278 -0.0597 -0.0294
(0.0509) (0.0585) (0.0737) (0.0537) (0.0603) (0.0690) (0.0612) (0.0665) (0.0602)
Observations 789 661 661 784 658 658 780 656 656
R-squared 0.033 0.107 0.254 0.019 0.076 0.241 0.018 0.079 0.263
Individual controls NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
IP fixed effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Avg. outcome for 25% group 0.753 0.753 0.753 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.645 0.645 0.645
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
VARIABLES
Panel A: All preselected
Assigned to 50% vulnerable -0.00821 0.0112 -0.0359 -0.0151 0.00593 0.0141
(0.0583) (0.0577) (0.0578) (0.0465) (0.0487) (0.0509)
Observations 967 842 842 961 835 835
R-squared 0.027 0.103 0.212 0.039 0.121 0.195
Avg. outcome for 25% group 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.185 0.185 0.185
Panel B: Preselected in savings groups only
Assigned to 50% vulnerable -0.0259 -0.0111 -0.0807 -0.0126 0.0204 0.0128
(0.0608) (0.0625) (0.0637) (0.0487) (0.0543) (0.0588)
Observations 779 656 656 773 649 649
R-squared 0.035 0.116 0.229 0.054 0.124 0.205
Individual controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
IP fixed effects NO NO YES NO NO YES
Avg. outcome for 25% group 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.202 0.202 0.202
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






Unweighted regressions from Table B9. See that table for details.
